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Snap Removal:  Concept; Cause; Cacophony; and Cure 
 
Jeffrey W. Stempel, Thomas O. Main & David McClure*© 
So-called “snap removal” – removal of a case from state to federal court prior to 
service on a forum state defendant – has divided federal trial courts for 20 years.  
Recently, panels of the Second, Third and Fifth Circuits have sided with those 
supporting the tactic even though it conflicts with the general prohibition on 
removal when the case includes a forum state defendant, a situation historically 
viewed as eliminating the need to protect the outsider defendant from possible 
state court hostility. 
 
Consistent with the public policy underlying diversity jurisdiction – availability of 
a federal forum to protect against defending claims in an inconvenient or hostile 
forum – such removals are barred so long as resident defendants are properly 
joined “and served.”  Defendants preferring the federal forum have invested 
significant resources monitoring state trial dockets in order to race to remove 
before service on forum defendants can be effectuated. 
 
Where such snap removal is permitted, defendants, both in-state and outsider are 
allowed to select their preferred forum – an outcome in derogation of the history, 
purpose, and logic of permitting removal.  This clever strategy of defense counsel 
is facilitated and accelerated by electronic docket monitoring and sometimes (as 
in the Third Circuit case) attorney trickery amounting to deceit.   
 
The recent federal appellate decisions are regrettable both in taking the wrong 
fork of the metaphorical road regarding snap removal and in shifting the trial 
court landscape from one of resistance to snap removal to one of toleration.   
 
Disturbingly, the appellate decisions (without recorded dissent) analyzed the 
issue through the simplistic lens of textual literalism with narry a nod to the 
history, purpose, and public policy of federal removal law.  In doing so, the 
Circuit panels not only reached a problematic result but also displayed an 
impoverished interpretative methodology.   
 
                                                      
*  Respectively, Doris S. & Theodore B. Lee Professor of Law, William S. Boyd School of Law, University of 
Nevada Las Vegas,  William S. Boyd Professor of Law, Boyd School of Law-UNLV, and Associate Professor & 
Associate Director, Wiener-Rogers Law Library, Boyd School of Law-UNLV.   © 2020 Jeffrey W. Stempel, 
Thomas O. Main & David McClure. 
    Thanks to organizers and participants in the Fifth Annual Civil Procedure Workshop (Oct. 2019)(UT-Austin) and 
the November 2019 Bay Area Civil Procedure Forum (Hastings), especially Bob Bone, Brooke Coleman, Josh 
Davis, Deborah Hensler, Rick Marcus, David Marcus, Jim Pfander, and Steve Vladeck  as well as to Steve Gensler,  
Dan Hamilton, Randy Maniloff, Ann McGinley, Jean Sternlight, Laura Rios, Kyle Hill, Aden Kebede, Krysa 
Cieszko, Zahava Lieberman, and McKay Holley.       
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Corrective action by Congress can put a stop to these mistaken results in a 
manner that vindicates the intent and purpose of the 1948 Congress that added 
the service requirement and that adequately protects the interests of both 
plaintiffs and defendants.  We outline and assess the most prominent suggestions 
for fixing the snap removal problem, including our own preferred solution.   
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Introduction 
 Imagine teaching removal to law students in a first-year Civil Procedure class.  The 
students already know basic subject matter jurisdiction, including diversity jurisdiction, which 
provides for federal judicial power over suits involving citizens of different states.1   Generally 
speaking, a New Yorker may sue a Philadelphian in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in a 
dispute involving more than $75,000.2  There must, however be “complete diversity”:  In a 
multi-party case, all of the plaintiffs and all of the defendants must be from different states.3  The 
students also know that this same suit can also be brought in the federal court in New York or the 
state courts of Pennsylvania or New York if standards for personal jurisdiction and venue are 
met.4 
 
 Now the students shift their study to the concept of removal to federal court as provided 
by 28 U.S.C. §1441, et seq., the general federal removal statute.5  Although generally permitting 
a state court defendant to remove the matter to federal court, the case “may not be removed if 
any of the parties in interest properly jointed and served as defendants is a citizen of the State in 
which such action is brought.”6    
 
Students generally grasp this aspect of removal without difficulty.7  Because diversity 
jurisdiction exists to protect a defendant from being sued in an inconvenient or hostile state 
court, federal court is available.  But where the matter is commenced in a defendant’s home 
state, the rationale of protecting that defendant from a plaintiff’s “home court advantage” 
evaporates.  The resident defendant is at home.  It therefore makes complete sense that he/she/it 
should not be permitted to remove the matter from his home state’s courts.  If there are other 
defendants from outside the forum state, this limitation on removal makes less intuitive sense but 
because of the longstanding “forum defendant” rule, the presence of a single forum state 
defendant historically has barred removal despite the presence of foreign defendants.   
 
 Few if any students would have thought that the bar to forum defendant removal could be 
circumvented by seizing upon the arguable glitch in the language of its prohibition.  Specifically, 
28 U.S.C. §1441(b)(2) prevents removal so long as any of the defendants properly joined and 
“and served” is not a forum state resident.  From this tidbit of language, clever defense lawyers 
seeking removal have, with considerable but not unanimous success, argued that resident 
                                                      
1 See generally 28 U.S.C. §1331 (federal question jurisdiction); 28 U.S.C. §1332 (diversity jurisdiction); BROOKE D. 
COLEMAN, ET AL., LEARNING CIVIL PROCEDURE Ch. 1 (3d ed. 2018)(outlining federal subject matter jurisdiction, 
including diversity).   
2 See 28 U.S.C. §1332 (setting forth diversity of citizenship requirements, including required amount in controversy 
as $75,000, exclusive of costs and interest). 
3 See Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. 267 (1806). 
4 See COLEMAN, ET AL., supra note 1, at       (explaining and illustrating concurrent jurisdiction as well as noting that 
certain claims (e.g., federal antitrust claims) are subject to exclusive federal court jurisdiction). 
5 See generally 28 U.S.C. §1441 (and through §1449). 
6 See 28 U.S.C. §1441(b)(2). 
7 Another author critical of snap removal would agree that this is “an easy civil procedure hypothetical.”  See 
Valerie M. Nannery, Closing the Snap Removal Loophole, 86 U. CIN. L. REV. 541, 543 (2018)(using example of a 
car crash with diversity but a forum defendant to illustrate restrictions on removal in cases involving a forum 
defendant but potential to evade this longstanding norm through snap removal.) 
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removal is proper so long as any defendant moves swiftly and effects removal prior to service 
upon a forum defendant. 
 
 When told of this potential loophole, students squint a bit in disbelief that the purpose of 
§1441(b)(2) could be so easily circumvented by outracing service of process.  To them, it is 
obvious that the availability of resident defendant removal should not turn on the happenstance 
of docket monitoring and the precise timing of service.  The intent and rationale of the restriction 
is clear: a home state defendant eliminates (or at least substantially dilutes) the danger of state 
court prejudice against outsiders.  Further, in such cases all plaintiffs are outsiders as the 
presence of even a single forum state plaintiff would destroy complete diversity and preclude 
removal.  
 
While taking advantage of a technicality to gain advantage over an opponent8 may all be 
in a tricky day’s work for company counsel (individual defendants make relatively little use of 
snap removal), we find the development disturbing on both substantive and jurisprudential 
grounds.   
 
Substantively, snap removal is problematic because it unduly restricts a historically 
recognized right of forum selection (so long as the forum satisfies a range of requirements)9 and 
                                                      
8 Regrettably, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in Encompass Insurance Co. v. Stone Mansion 
Restaurant, Inc., 902 F.3d 147 (3d Cir. 2018)(involving Pennsylvania substantive law), discussed at TAN 114-128, 
appears to have embraced a model of litigation as gamesmanship as well as a strikingly stiff application of 
textualism when interpreting statutes.  In the process, Third Circuit panel lost sight of more valid indicia of statutory 
meaning while simultaneously blessing problematic litigation conduct in the course of unduly expanding removal 
jurisdiction. 
9 Defendants routinely decry “forum shopping” by plaintiffs.  To be sure, one can find examples of some grimace-
inducing tactics for seeking a favorable forum.  See, e.g., Piper Aircraft v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1981)(Plaintiff 
lawyer’s secretary become administrator of decedent’s estate in attempt to site lawsuit in California in connection 
with airplane crash in Scotland; court ultimately applies forum non conveniens thinking to dismiss U.S. action); 
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302 (1981)(plaintiffs successfully sue in Minnesota and obtain application of 
Minnesota law for auto accident that took place in Wisconsin involving Wisconsin citizens)(see also Thomas O. 
Main, On Teaching Conflicts and Why I Dislike Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hague, 12 NEV. L.J. 600 (2012)(analyzing 
Hague as part of a symposium on “worst” Supreme Court decision). 
 Advocates of expanded removal to federal court or expansion of federal jurisdiction through minimal 
diversity tend to overlook the substantial hurdles a plaintiff must clear to prevail against a defendant in state court, 
impediments that provide quite a good deal of protection to defendants and refute the argument that state courts are 
hostile to defendants.  Plaintiff must establish subject matter jurisdiction (although not a big hurdle in state court), 
personal jurisdiction, apt venue sufficient to withstand a forum non conveniens challenge, standing, and (to state the 
oft-forgotten obvious) a right to relief on the merits, which normally entails surviving a dismissal motion, a 
summary judgment motion, two or more motions for judgment as a matter of law, and perhaps motions for a new 
trial or reduced award as well.  In light of this gauntlet faced by plaintiffs, defendant complaints of unfairness being 
held to account for alleged wrongdoing in state court are not particularly heart-rending. 
 And, of course, one can also find extreme examples of defendants successfully forum shopping by 
commencing pre-emptive strikes in preferred jurisdictions when anticipating a plaintiff action (declaratory judgment 
actions by insurers seeking to deny coverage are a common example) or by including forum choice provisions in 
lengthy, boilerplate contract documents.  See, e.g., Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela, 587 U.S. __, 139 S.Ct. 1407 (2019) 
(enforcing arbitration clause and holding that even if clause is silent on the topic class treatment of common or 
aggregated claims impermissible; decision elevates Court’s (by 5-4 vote) concept of arbitration over state contract 
law).  See Linda S. Mullinex, Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute: The Titanic of Worst Decisions, 12 NEV. L.J. 549 
(2012)(identifying Carnival Cruise Lines v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585 (1991), which enforced a Florida forum selection 
clause against passengers from Washington state alleging injuries, as one of the “worst” Supreme Court decisions); 
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shifts the balance of litigation prerogatives rather significantly in the direction of business 
defendants who prefer federal court because federal judges and juries are viewed as generally 
more hospitable to corporate defendants or perhaps even hostile to particular plaintiffs or types 
of cases.10  Correspondingly, this has the effect of shifting outcomes in favor of non-liability or 
lower settlements by business defendants and reduced recovery for injured individuals or small 
businesses.11 
 
Perhaps even more disturbingly, support for snap removal depends upon an excessively 
literal textualist approach to application of civil litigation statutes and rules that downplays or 
even ignores legislative intent, statutory purpose, and the structure of federal litigation 
underlying two centuries of law regarding subject matter jurisdiction and removal.12 
 
Courts embracing snap removal unduly embrace textual formalism without sufficient 
consideration of whether congressional drafters intended such literal reading of their words.  
Functional aspects of law are given insufficient consideration.13  These elevate form over 
substance and reward trickery, opportunism, and economic advantage while devaluing not only 
plaintiff rights but also the structure of American legal federalism.14 
                                                                                                                                                                              
Charles Knapp,  Contract Law Walks the Plank: Carnival Cruise Lines v. Shute, 12 NEV. L.J. 553 (2012)(also 
identifying Shute as one of the Court’s worst decisions). 
10 This conventional wisdom is reflected in the frequency with which defendants sued in state court seek removal – 
with snap removal representing an extreme example.  The defendants seeking snap removal are doing so as a matter 
of company policy (reflected by the expense incurred to monitor dockets) with essentially no time to make a case-
specific assessment of the relative strengths or weaknesses of state and federal court. 
 Accompanying the rise in snap removal has been a curtailment of personal jurisdiction, particularly general 
jurisdiction that might have been invoked wherever a defendant has “continuous and systematic” presence (the 
verbal standard prevailing prior to 2011).  See Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915 
(2011)(general jurisdiction normally available only where corporate defendant is “at home” by virtue of 
incorporation or location of principal place of business); Damler AG v. Bauman, , 571 U.S. 117 (2014)(same).  See 
also J. McIntyre Machinery Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873 (2011)(court in 5-4 decision takes narrow view of 
specific personal jurisdiction); Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 582 U.S. __, 137 S. Ct. 1773 
(2017)(same).  One arguable effect of this jurisdictional shift is to prompt more plaintiffs to sue in the home state 
court of a defendant. 
 The conventional wisdom is that urban jurors are generally sympathetic to plaintiffs while suburban and 
rural jurors are more favorable to defendants.  Federal court districts are almost always geographically larger than 
state court districts and therefore include a higher percentage of suburban and rural citizens (as well as older, whiter, 
more affluent citizens) in the jury pool.  Federal judges are perceived as more sympathetic to corporate defendants 
and the needs of commerce by virtue of the federal bench’s more frequent background as business attorneys as 
compared to a state court bench with proportionally more judges who are former plaintiff and legal aid attorneys.  
See ROGER S. HAYDOCK, ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF PRETRIAL LITIGATION §4.5.8 at 184 (10th ed. 
2016)(“Defendants who are sued in state court should consider whether the controversy may be removed to federal 
court and whether they are likely to benefit from the federal forum.  Conversely, plaintiffs who have chosen the state 
court will want to seek the remand of cases improperly removed to federal court.”). 
11 We are not suggesting that removal to federal court inevitably means the defeat of meritorious claims.  But we do 
contend that even meritorious claims will be more difficult to successfully prosecute in federal court and that 
lawyers recognize this (as reflected in the manner in which defense lawyers seek removal and plaintiff counsel seeks 
remand), which in turn logically translates to lower settlement value of cases removed to federal court. 
12 See text and accompanying note (“TAN”) 141-163, infra (criticizing narrow textualism and in particular its use in 
adjudicating snap removal remand motions). 
13  See TAN 141-163, infra (criticizing formalist jurisprudence in contrast to more functional legal analysis). 
14 Although it is perhaps a bit melodramatic to invoke the Founders for a debate about removal, which we concede 
lacks the greater stakes of unfair search and seizure, cruel or unusual punishment, or rights of free expression, we 
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Rigid reading of civil procedure statutes and rules is problematic.  The sound basic idea 
of treating the language of a statute as the exclusive indicator of meaning can become an 
instrument for missing that meaning.  The words of a statute, rule, or document are of course 
important.  But reading them in rigid isolation can easily lead to misinterpretation in derogation 
of intent, purpose, and meaning of the statute, rule or document containing the words.   
 
Reading the words “and served” in §1441(b)(2) to permit snap approval reaches an 
incorrect application of the statute that reflects the limits of the textualist approach.  We agree 
with those who favor a more functional approach that incorporates the legislative intent, history, 
function, purpose, public policy, and court system structure underlying diversity jurisdiction and 
removal.     
 
Nonetheless, this literal textualist approach permitting snap removal has enjoyed strong 
support among the trial bench and has the so-far unanimous support of the three federal appellate 
courts assessing the issue.  Absent Supreme Court resolution of the issue against snap removal, it 
appears that only legislation can correct the problem.    
 
I. History and Background   
 
A. The Rationale of Diversity Jurisdiction 
 
 Diversity jurisdiction has roots in the Constitution itself.  Article III provides that the 
judicial power extends to all “controversies . . . between citizens of different States.,”15 
jurisdiction codified in 28 U.S.C. §1332, which gives trial courts “original jurisdiction of all civil 
actions” involving claims greater than $75,000 that are “between . . .  citizens of different 
states.”16   
 
 Although the drafting history of this portion of Article III and the Judiciary Act of 1789 is 
relatively thin, it is generally accepted that the purpose of diversity jurisdiction was to provide a 
forum where litigants disputing with those of other states could theoretically avoid prejudice 
against outsiders.17  Thus, diversity jurisdiction provides a means by which an out-of-state 
plaintiff can avoid the metaphorical lion’s den of a state court arena inclined to impose liability 
                                                                                                                                                                              
nonetheless maintain that in establishing the federal bench and the parameters of its relation to state courts as well as 
diversity jurisdiction, those who designed the U.S. legal system were interested in avoiding unfair local prejudice 
and did not endorse technical evasion of state court based on the timing of service of process. 
15 U.S. Const. Art. III, §1. 
16 28 U.S.C. §1332(a)(1). 
17 See MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE, §102.02 (addressing historical basis of diversity jurisdiction); §102App.01 
(reviewing constitutional basis and background of diversity jurisdiction); §102App.03[1] (reviewing historical 
reason for diversity jurisdiction)(sections authored by Martin H. Redish); John P. Frank, Historical Bases for 
Diversity Jurisdiction, 13 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1 (1948).  See also John P. Frank, The Case for Diversity 
Jurisdiction, 16 HARV. J. LEGIS. 403 (1979)(contending that state court prejudice against non-citizens remains a 
danger); John P. Frank, For Maintaining Diversity Jurisdiction, 73 YALE L.J. 7, 10-12 (1963)(same).  Judicial 
opinions have historically expressed this view.  See, e.g., Burgess v. Seligman, 107 U.S. 20, 34 (1883); United 
States v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. 61 (1809); Stifel v. Hopkins, 477 F.2d 1116, 1125-26 (6th Cir. 1973); China Basin Props., 
Ltd. v. Allendale Mut. Ins. Co., 818 F. Supp. 1301, 1304 (N.D. Cal. 1992). 
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on an outsider for the benefit of a local resident or to protect an insider from the claims of an 
outsider.18   
 
The legal system gives plaintiffs, both resident and non-resident, a choice of where to 
commence litigation.19  Always somewhat controversial,20 diversity jurisdiction has at several 
junctures been under particular attack that included calls for its abolition or curtailment.21  
However, as commentators have also noted, there remain solid arguments for retaining diversity 
jurisdiction22 and lawyers have consistently endorsed diversity jurisdiction through both vocal 
support and use, including use via removal.23 
 
But despite its long history and continued support by major segments of the bar, diversity 
jurisdiction remains constricted to a degree.  Although it is not inexorably required by the 
language of the statute or the rationale of diversity jurisdiction, courts have for more than 200 
years required that there be “complete” diversity:  all of the plaintiffs and all of the defendants 
must be citizens of different states24 – at least as regards the jurisdictional statute.25    
                                                      
18 This view of and rationale for diversity jurisdiction would appear to hold even if the traditional justification for 
diversity – a general concern over state system prejudice toward outsiders – is replaced with the more nuanced and 
perhaps legal realist-cum-cynical view that diversity jurisdiction was established primarily to assuage the concerns 
of past creditors and future investors who feared that state courts would not enforce contracts and debt collection 
efforts.  See MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE §§102.03; 102App.03[1]; Henry J. Friendly, The Historic Basis of 
Diversity Jurisdiction, 41 HARV. L. REV. 483, 496-98 (1928).  Even if the framers were particularly focused on state 
court prejudice toward creditors, this is but a refinement of the traditional understanding of the rationale for diversity 
jurisdiction rather than a rejection.  See also MOORE’S, supra note 17, §102App.03[2] (crediting diversity 
jurisdiction and general federal common law of Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1 (1842) with substantial contribution to 
U.S. economic growth through increasing investor confidence. 
19 Giving forum state citizens the option of state or federal court is, however, not particularly consistent with the 
protection-against-prejudice rationale of diversity jurisdiction. 
20 See MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 17, §102App.03[1] at 102App.-4 (“Diversity jurisdiction is and 
always has been controversial”). 
21 See MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 17, §§102.04, 102App.03[1] & [2]; FEDERAL COURTS STUDY 
COMMITTEE, JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMM. 
(1990)(recommending substantial reduction in availability of diversity jurisdiction limited to complex multistate 
litigation, interpleader, and suits involving aliens); CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 127-37 
(4th 3d. 1983)(favoring substantial curtailment or even elimination of diversity jurisdiction); Henry J. Friendly, 
Federal Jurisdiction: A General View 139-72 (1973); AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF 
JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS (1969); ROBERT JACKSON, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE 
AMERICAN SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT 37 (1955); Larry Kramer, Diversity Jurisdiction, 1990 B.Y.U. L. REV. 97 
(Reporter of Federal Courts Study Committee supports diversity curtailment recommendations); Thomas Rowe, 
Abolishing Diversity Jurisdiction: Positive Side Effects and Potential for Further Reforms, 92 HARV. L. REV. 963 
(1979); William Bratton, Diversity Jurisdiction – An Idea Whose Time Has Passed, 51 IND. L.J. 347 (1976); Felix 
Frankfurter, Distribution of Judicial Power Between United States and State Courts, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 499 (1928). 
22 See also MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 17, §102App.03[2] at 102App.-11 to 12 (collecting arguments 
justifying continued availability of diversity jurisdiction including continued presence of local bias; existence of 
urban-rural bias within same state;  permitting attorneys option to litigate more often in familiar court; and arguably 
better quality of federal courts due credentials of judges, independence afforded by life tenure, well-crafted rules; 
and relatively greater concentration of resources per case).   
23 See MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 17, §102App.03[2] at 102App.-10; Charles Brieant, Diversity 
Jurisdiction: Why Does the Bar Talk One Way But Vote the Other Way With Its Feet, 1989 N.Y. ST. B.J. 20; John 
Parker, The Federal Jurisdiction and Recent Attacks Upon It, 18 A.B.A. J. 433 (1932). 
24 See Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. 267 (1806). 
25 See State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523, 531 (1967).  Article III of the Constitution requires only 
minimal diversity of citizenship.  Hence, a statute may confer subject matter jurisdiction on the basis of minimal 
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The assumption underlying this requirement is that the presence of one or more in-state 
defendants sufficiently suppresses any state temptation to find for plaintiff on the basis of home 
state prejudice.26  Although the validity of this assumption can be questioned,27 it has been 
essentially unchallenged over the years28 and forms the basis for limitations on removal when 
one or more defendant is a citizen of the forum state.  And even if the rationale of the forum 
defendant limitation on removal is suspect, it nonetheless has long been “baked in” to the civil 
litigation system, nested with legal doctrine that sometimes favors plaintiffs and sometimes 
favors defendants.  If the forum defendant rule is substantially weakened (via snap removal or 
any other litigation innovation), the equilibrium of the system is disturbed absent a 
countervailing development favorable to plaintiffs. 
 
In addition to the amount-in-controversy requirement that limits diversity jurisdiction 
(and removal as well), requirement, there are other aspects of the diversity jurisdiction statute 
that effectively contract the availability of diversity jurisdiction and consequently restrict 
removal.   
 
For example, corporations are deemed citizens of their states of incorporation and 
principal places of business,29 which case law has defined as the managerial headquarters of the 
corporation.30  This means that there are, for most corporations, two “home” states rather than 
                                                                                                                                                                              
diversity, as does the federal interpleader statute, 28 U.S.C. §1335.  Pursuant to Strawbridge v. Curtiss and its 
progeny, 28 U.S.C. §1332(1) has been viewed as stopping short of the full breadth of Article III diversity 
jurisdiction. 
26 See MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 17, §102App.04[2](discussing Strawbridge v. Curtiss and its 
rationale for the complete diversity requirement). 
27 For example, consider a case in which Local Plaintiff A, the victim of a defective product, sues Local Defendant 
A (the retailer), Local Defendant B (the wholesaler), and Foreign Defendant C (the manufacturer) on a theory of 
defective product design.  The obvious deep pocket here is the manufacturer, who also may be seen as most culpable 
in a design defect case.  The wholesaler and retailer are proper defendants by law per MacPherson v. Buick, 111 
N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916) and its progeny but may have done nothing more than participate in the chain of distribution.  
Although there are two local defendants in the state court lawsuit, they are not the “target” defendants.  
If state court prejudice against outsiders is a reality (an assumption that may be outdated in the more 
homogenized modern world), common sense strongly suggests that when jurors are deciding who to blame for Local 
Plaintiff’s serious injuries, the Foreign Defendant Manufacturer is likely to be seen as the culprit. 
Consequently, the rationale of complete diversity as well as the rationale of the “forum defendant” 
limitation on removal may be flawed to the point of being completely wrong, at least in cases where the foreign 
defendant is the target defendant.  But it is nonetheless the agreed rule that should be sufficiently respected that it is 
not thwarted through snap removal. 
28 At least by Congress or other policymakers.  There has never to our knowledge been a legislative effort to amend 
28 U.S.C. §1332 to provide for minimal diversity that has threatened to succeed.  But see MOORE’S FEDERAL 
PRACTICE, supra note    , §102App.04[2](discussing modest congressional expansion of diversity jurisdiction in 
reaction to Strawbridge v. Curtiss);  Press Release, Sen. Lee Introduces Constitutionally Sound Tort Reform (current 
U.S. Senator Mike Lee (R-Utah) sponsors legislation to establish minimal diversity jurisdiction)(stating that 
proposed legislation would allow “access to federal court for any case where at least one defendant is from out of 
state.”). There has, however, been scholarly commentary arguing for change to the complete diversity requirement.  
See, e.g., ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 288 (3d ed. 1999); Debra Lyn Bassett, The Hidden Bias in 
Diversity Jurisdiction, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 119 (2003).  See also James M. Underwood, The Late, Great Diversity 
Jurisdiction, 57 CASE WESTERN L. REV. 179 (2005)(noting continuing resilience and even expansion of diversity 
jurisdiction despite criticisms). 
29 28 U.S.C. §1332(c)(1). 
30 See Hertz v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 92-92 (2010). 
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one, which provides plaintiffs with twice as many opportunities to defeat complete diversity and 
limit removal due to the presence of an in-state defendant.  
 
Unincorporated associations are considered citizens of any state in which there is a 
member.31  This  limits diversity jurisdiction significantly if not eliminating it entirely for cases 
involving certain defendants.32  Although there are other provisions of the statute contracting 
multiple citizenship (e.g., equating estate representative citizenship with that of the decedent;33 
deeming an insurer a citizen of the policyholder’s state34), there are also doctrinal exceptions to 
diversity jurisdiction for domestic relations matters,35 probate matters,36 and real property 
disputes.37 
 
In addition, there are other congressionally mandated exceptions to diversity 
jurisdiction,38 including a specific limitation on diversity jurisdiction in cases where  
 
[a] district court may, in the interests of justice and looking at the totality of the 
circumstances, decline to exercise jurisdiction under [1332(d)(2)]39 over a class 
action greater than one-third but less than two-thirds of the members of all 
proposed plaintiff classes in the aggreate and the primary defendants are citizens 
of the State in which the action was originally filed based upon [five enumerated 
considerations].40  
                                                      
31 See Lincoln Property Co. v. Roche, 546 U.S. 81, 89 (2005); Carden v. Arkoma Associates, 494 U.S. 185, 189 
(1990). 
32 For example, consider a creditor suing the Democratic Party or the Republican Party for an unpaid debt.  Even in 
a world where there are distinctly “red” and “blue” states, there are no states with no Democrats or Republicans in 
the population.  Even less vast organizations will have members in many states.  But the importance of this aspect of 
diversity jurisdiction may be considerably lessened to the extent that unincorporated organizations operate through 
any sufficiently separate entities that have a distinct citizenship. 
33 See 28 U.S.C. §1332(c)(2). 
34 See 28 U.S.C. §1332(c)(1). 
35 See Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689 (1992). 
36 See Marshall v. Marshall, 547 U.S. 293 (2006); In re Broderick’s Will, 88 U.S. 503 (11874). 
37 See DAVID F. HERR, ET AL., MOTION PRACTICE §10.03[F] 10-14 (7th ed. 2016)(federal courts have “long been 
loath” to adjudicate local property disputes even if there is jurisdiction based on text of 1332); John D. Echeverria, 
Note, Land Use Regulation, the Federal Courts, and the Abstention Doctrine, 89 YALE L.J. 1134 (1980). 
38 See COLEMAN, ET AL., supra note 1, at 55 (Restrictions on diversity jurisdiction involving “some relatively large 
class actions, interpleader actions in which the holder of a common fund brings a lawsuit against all rival claimants 
to its own fund, and multi-party, multi-forum cases involving multiple victims of a disaster). 
39 28 U.S.C. §1332(d)(2) results from the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (“CAFA”), which provides expanded 
federal jurisdiction over class actions on the basis of minimal where the matter in controversy exceeds $5 million so 
lon as any member of the plaintiff class is citizen of a state outside the forum state.  CAFA was enacted in response 
to concerns that many state court class actions were resulting in quick “sweetheart” settlements for counsel and 
lacked sufficient adversary posture and development of the facts.  See COLEMAN, ET AL., supra note 1, at 404-05. 
40 See 28 U.S.C. §1332(d)(3).  The six enumerated considerations are: “ (A) whether the claims asserted involve 
matters of national or interstate interest; (B) whether the claims asserted will be governed by the laws of the State in 
which the action was originally filed or by the laws of other States; (C) whether the class action has been pleaded in 
a manner that seeks to avoid Federal jurisdiction; (D) whether the action was brought in a forum with a distinct 
nexus with the class members, the alleged harm, or the defendants; whether the number of citizens of the State in 
which the action was originally filed in all proposed plaintiff classes in the aggregate is substantially larger than the 
number of citizens from any other State, and the citizenship of the other members of the proposed class is dispersed 
among a substantial number of States; and (F) whether, during the 3-year period preceding the filing of that class 
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Thus, even expansions of federal diversity jurisdiction remain subject to the tradition of a 
constrained view of such jurisdiction.  It has long been the rule that federal courts are courts of 
limited jurisdiction41 and that federal jurisdiction is to be strictly rather than expansively 
construed,42 with doubts resolved against finding jurisdiction43 and in favor of remand44 of 
removed cases if the party asserting jurisdiction cannot successfully shoulder the burden of 
persuasion.45 
 
B. The Rationale and Evolution of Removal 
 
 Diversity jurisdiction remains firmly ensconced in American law – but its niche has 
generally been closely cabined.  Removal enjoys or is burdened by a similar status.  It has 
existed for many decades and remains popular but is constrained by some of the same concerns 
surrounding diversity jurisdiction generally. A foreign defendant sued in state court may – 
provided certain conditions are met – remove the case to federal court.  Thus, forum shopping by 
opportunistic plaintiffs hoping to trade upon home court advantage can be constrained, at least in 
part.46 
                                                                                                                                                                              
action, 1 or more other class actions asserting the same or similar claims on behalf of the same or other persons have 
been filed.”  See 28 U.S.C. §1332(d)(3)(A)-(F). 
41 See COLEMAN, ET AL., supra note 1, at 6 (“[t]he federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction”).  By contrast, 
state courts are courts of general jurisdiction that are open to hearing all justiciable disputes without regard to the 
law involved or the identity or citizenship of the parties or the amount in controversy.  Id. at 5-7.  That said, state 
courts doors may be effectively closed to certain claims that are exclusively federal in nature (e.g., federal antitrust 
law) and for which there is not concurrent jurisdiction.  In general, however, a federal claim for relief may be 
prosecuted in state court.  See, e.g., Yellow Freight System v. Donnelly, 489 U.S. 820 (1990)(claims arising 
pursuant to Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §2000e et seq., may be heard by state courts). 
42 See City of Indianapolis v. Chase National Bank, 314 U.S. 63 (1942); Detres v. Lions Blg. Corp., 234 F.2d 596, 
597 (7th Cir. 1956); MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 17, §102.13. 
43 See MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 17, §102.13. 
44 See Boyer v. Snap-On Tools Corp., 913 F.2d 108, 111-13 (3d Cir. 1990); Freeman v. Northwest Acceptance 
Corp., 754 F.2d 553, 560 (5th Cir. 1985); MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 17, §102.13.  
45 See McNutt v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S. 178 (1936); MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note   
, §102.14.  Similarly, the defendant removing a case typically bears the burden of proof regarding the propriety of 
removal.  See Americold Realty Trust v. Conagra Foods, Inc., 577 U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 1012 (2016); Jerome-Duncan, 
Inc. v. Auto-By-Tel, L.L.C., 176 F.3d 904, 907 (6th Cir. 1999); MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 17, 
§102.121[3][a]. 
46 Removal alone does not, as discussed below, permit the foreign defendant to avoid plaintiff’s chosen state 
entirely.  The case is removed from the judicial system of State X to the federal judiciary of State X but remains in 
State X, the federal trial bench of which is likely to contain almost exclusively lawyers who practiced in State X 
prior to appointment and who have longstanding ties to State X.  In addition, the jurors hearing disputes in federal 
court, like the jurors called to duty in state court, are all residents of State X.  Consequently, a move to federal court 
does not necessarily eliminate whatever jingoism may exist in the bench, bar, venire, media, or general population of 
State X.  And unless there is something intrinsically more neutral about federal judges relative to state judges, 
litigating in federal court, the removal may not eliminate local prejudice so much as it confers other tactical 
advantages. 
     For defendants, the tactical advantages of federal court are considered significant by practicing lawyers.  
Although federal trial judges may not be morally superior to state judges, they have life tenure that state judges lack 
and are thought to be less subject to ruling based on concern for job preservation.  Although federal jurors and state 
jurors both come from the same state, unless a state claim is filed in a very rural area, the state jurors will tend to 
come from a more urban environment that is more economically, socially, racially, ethnically, and religiously 
diverse while federal jurors will be disproportionately older, whiter, and more suburban or rural.   
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 Removal, described by one court as a “judicial curiosity incidental to our dual system of 
government,”47 is not expressly mentioned in Article III but was established in the Judiciary Act 
of 1789.48  Removal has consistently been among the more bedeviling aspects of civil litigation.  
According to one court, “[t]here is no other phase of American jurisprudence with so many 
refinements and subtleties.”49  A leading commentator describes the history of removal as “filled 
with confusion and incoherence.”50 
 
 Removal, like federal jurisdiction generally and diversity jurisdiction in particular, has a 
number of narrowing aspects.  It must be sought within a certain, strict time limit (30 days) 
following specific presentation and filing requirements.51  Perhaps most important, even if 
complete diversity exists between all plaintiffs and all defendants, removal has historically not 
been permitted if any of the defendants is a citizen of the forum state.  This is the “forum 
defendant” or “resident defendant” rule.52   
                                                                                                                                                                              
     According to longstanding conventional wisdom, the rural jury will be more supportive of business and more 
economically and socially conservative as well.  Hence, the federal jury will be less likely to render a large 
compensatory or punitive damages award.   
     Current federal civil procedure tends to be more favorable to defendants than corresponding state procedure.  For 
example, the U.S. Supreme Court in 1986 decided a series of cases (the so-called summary judgment “trilogy”) that 
made summary judgment easier for defendants to obtain.  See COLEMAN, ET AL., ,  supra note 1, at 598-603.  But 
many states have failed to embrace the trilogy or did so only belatedly.  See Wood v. Safeway, 121 P.3d 1026 (Nev. 
2005).  And according to conventional wisdom of litigators in states like Nevada, state judges remain less likely to 
grant summary judgment than their federal counterparts even if the doctrine is congruent.  See generally NATIONAL 
CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF STATE COURTS AND STATE JUSTICE INSTITUTE, CIVIL JUSTICE INITIATIVE, THE 
LANDSCAPE OF CIVIL LITIGATION IN STATE COURTS 15-16, 22 (2015)(summary judgment granted in only 4 percent 
of state court cases during 1992); Arthur R. Miller, The Ascent of Summary Judgment and Its Consequences for 
State Courts and State Law 16-20 (2008)(Paper Presented at Pound Civil Justice Institute 2008 Forum for State 
Appellate Court Judges)(on file with authors)(majority of states have adopted rationale of U.S. Supreme Court 1986 
summary judgment trilogy but application varies by state and judge); COLEMAN, ET AL., supra note 1 at 811 and 
Comprehensive Study Guide (available on line for purchases)(on file with authors). 
 Treatment of motions to dismiss also differentiates state and federal courts.  Both authorize use of a motion 
to dismiss plaintiff cases for “failure to state a claim.”  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)(state numbering may differ).  
But since 2007 and particularly 2009, federal courts have used a more muscular form of the motion, one which 
permits the judge to ask not only whether the plaintiffs have made allegations that if true would justify legal relief 
but whether the allegations and claim are sufficiently “plausible.”  See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 
544 (2007); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009).  See COLEMAN, ET AL., supra note 1, at 609-10. 
               In addition, the availability of discovery in federal court has been curtailed somewhat by 1993 
Amendments limiting discovery to matters relevant to a “claim” rather than the “subject matter” of a lawsuit and 
requiring that discovery by “proportional” to the need for information and stakes of the cases.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 
26; COLEMAN, ET AL., supra note 1, at 470. 
               These and other factors combine to make federal court generally viewed as more hospitable to defendants 
generally and to manufacturers, pharmaceutical companies, retailers, banks, and insurers in particular.  These types 
of defendants routinely seek to remove litigation from state to federal court.   
47 Tincy v. McClain, 76 F. Supp. 694, 698 (N.D. Tex. 1948). 
48  See MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 17, §107.03. 
49 Hagerla v. Mississippi River Power Co., 202 F. 771, 773 (S.D. Iowa 1912). 
50  MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 17, §102.03 at 107-18.  See also Nannery, supra note 7 at 546-49 
(describing history of removal and forum defendant rule). 
51 See 28 U.S.C.  §§1446-1447; MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 17, §§107.91; 107.140. 
52 28 U.S.C. §1441(b)(2); See MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 17, §107.55. 
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For example, a New Jersey citizen plaintiff alleging ingestion of tainted food while on a 
guitar shopping trip in Nazareth, Pennsylvania may sue in Pennsylvania state court the diner (a 
Pennsylvania citizen), its beef distributor (a New York citizen), and the Wichita-based 
manufacturer/processor of the beef patties used in the tainted burger (a  Kansas citizen).   
 
There is complete diversity but the case may not be removed because one of the 
defendants (the diner) is a citizen of the forum state.  “The rule applies to removal by any of the 
defendants, not just the forum defendant.”53 This forum defendant limitation on removal has 
existed since the relative dawn of removal.  Its rationale is that the presence of the local 
defendant effectively discourages state court bias.   
 
The purpose of diversity jurisdiction is to provide litigants with an unbiased 
forum by protecting out-of-state litigants from local prejudices.  Therefore, it 
makes no sense to allow an in-state defendant to take advantage of removal on the 
basis of diversity jurisdiction.  Out-of-state defendants, on the other hand, will be 
cloaked, at least theoretically, with the “home court” advantage because they are 
being sued along with an in-state defendant by an out-of-state plaintiff [otherwise 
there would be no diversity jurisdiction].  Of course, this argument fails to take 
account of the possible finger-pointing that could occur among the defendants, 
which would put the out-of-state defendant very much at a disadvantage in terms 
of the local-bias perspective.  Nonetheless, the general removal statute clearly 
precludes removal if any of the defendants is a citizen of the state in which the 
action was brought.54 
 
In the above example, the rationale would seem unassailable in that the plaintiff (New 
Jersey citizen) is if anything at a bias/prejudice disadvantage relative to the home state 
(Pennsylvania citizen).  But if we modify the hypothetical to make the plaintiff a Pennsylvanian 
suing the famous Tick Tock diner in Northern New Jersey55 (and the distributor and 
manufacturer) in New Jersey state court, one has less confidence in the rationale of the forum 
defendant rule.  To be sure, jurors in Essex County New Jersey may have a soft spot for a 
venerable local establishment.  But that hardly equates to similar attitudes toward the diner’s 
New York wholesaler or Kansas manufacturer.  They are still outsiders that may be tempting 
deeper pocket targets for jurors concerned about the financial consequences of a judgment 
against a local business.  Finger-pointing is almost sure to ensue. 
 
But however undertheorized and overdone, the forum defendant rule has been the law of 
removal for more than 200 years.  Rightly or wrongly, it represents a long-standing public policy 
                                                      
53 MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 17, §107.55[1] at 107-107. 
54  MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 17, §107.55[1] at 107-108. 
55 Clifton, New Jersey, to be more precise.  The diner, which sits on a major thoroughfare outside New York City 
has become something of an iconic symbol of this genre of restaurants, sufficiently so that it attracts celebrity visits.  
See, e.g., Mick Jagger tests new heart valve with artery-clogging meal, N.Y. POST (Aug 5, 2019, 
http//www.nypost.com (“Jagger was en route to Met Life Stadium for a Thursday night Stones performance when . . 
. [h]e made a pit stop at Clifton, NJ’s trucker-friendly 24-hour Tick Tock Diner” where “‘We had Taylor ham, egg 
and Cheese! With disco fries and sloppy Joe to go?’”).  
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judgment by legal system that posits that state court hostility toward outsiders is sufficiently 
reduced by the presence of a single in-state defendant to bar removal.56 
 
The removal statute has been amended on multiple occasions,57 perhaps most 
significantly in 1948, when the “properly joined and served” language, discussed in more detail 
below, was added.58  Most of the revisions over the years are what might be termed 
housekeeping or organizational and linguistic clarifications.59   
 
The 2011 amendments were more significant but did not substantively address the 
properly-joined-and-served language,60 a fact that has been used by both proponents and 
opponents of snap removal in their arguments about the practice.  Proponents of snap removal 
argue that the lack of any change in the service requirement language reflects tacit congressional 
approval or at least acceptance of decisions applying the literal meaning of the requirement.  
Opponents argue that the absence of any substantive discussion of the service requirement 
language in 2011 indicates that Congress has not focused on the issue and is most likely unaware 
that half or more of the snap removal decisions have taken a literalist approach to the statutory 
language that undermines the larger statutory objective of the forum defendant rule. 
   
C. The "Properly Joined and Served" Language 
 
 The original removal provision did not include the "properly joined and served" 
limitation, which Congress made a part of Title 28 in 1948.61  As noted above, the statutory 
removal provisions (28 U.S.C. §§1441-1450) were significantly revised in 1948, at which time 
                                                      
56 Although concern over local bias remains, there are also signs that policymakers have since the mid-20th Century 
regarded the problem as waning over time, a view that supports arguments in favor of further curtailment or even 
elimination of diversity jurisdiction and related removal.  Regarding one aspect of the 1948 revisions 
 
[a]ll the provisions with reference to removal of controversies between citizens of different States 
because of inability, form prejudice or local influence, to obtain justice, have been discarded.  
These provisions, born of the bitter sectional feelings engendered by the Civil War and the 
Reconstruction period, have no place in the jurisprudence of a nation since united by three wars 
against foreign powers.  Indeed, the practice of removal for prejudice or local influence has not 
been employed much in recent years. 
 
See Committee Note to 1948 Amendments; Federal Courts Jurisdiction and Venue Clarification Act, reprinted in 
MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE §107App.01[2] at 107App.-5.  Subsequent developments suggest that congressional 
staff spoke too soon.  Although modern removal may not be based on genuine concerns about local prejudice, it’s 
use has grown over the years based on the alternative motivation of defendants to seek the more pro-defendant 
confines of federal court. 
57 See generally MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 17, §§107App.01-107App.113. 
58 See MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 17, §§107App.01 at 107App.-1, -107App.113. 
59 See, e.g., Committee Note to 2011 Amendments; Federal Courts Jurisdiction and Venue Clarification Act, 
reprinted in MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE §107App13[2] at 107App.-34.13: “[revisions of the statute place] the 
provisions that apply to diversity actions under one subsection.  This change is intended to make it easier for 
litigants to locate the provisions that apply uniquely to diversity removal.” See generally MOORE’S FEDERAL 
PRACTICE, supra note 17, §§107App.01-107App.113. 
60 See Committee Note to 2011 Amendments; Federal Courts Jurisdiction and Venue Clarification Act, reprinted in 
MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 17, §107App13[2] at 107App.-34.14 (“Proposed paragraph 1441(b)(2) 
restates the substance of the last sentence of current subsection 1441(b), which relates only to diversity.”). 
61 See 1 Stat. 72, 79-80, codified at 28 U.S.C. § 114 (1940); 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (1948). 
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28 U.S.C. §1441(b)(2) was amended to include its current language stating that cases qualifying 
for diversity jurisdiction (and hence meeting the statutory requirement that original jurisdiction 
exist) “shall be removable only if none of the parties in interest properly joined and served as 
defendants is a citizen of the State in which such action is brought.”62   
   
 There appears to be consensus that the "properly joined and served" language of 28 
U.S.C. §1441(b)(2) was added to prevent the abuse of the forum defendant rule63 by improper or 
“fraudulent” joinder of a forum citizen defendant that was not seriously being pursued by the 
plaintiff but was only named in the suit to thwart removal.64   
 
However, the published legislative history regarding the 1948 changes is inconclusive.  
For example, there is neither a specific statement from Congress nor from the Advisory 
Committee on Revision of the Judicial Code (the "Committee"), regarding the addition of the 
"properly joined and served" language.65 In addition, appellate court guidance regarding snap 
                                                      
62 See 28 U.S.C. §1441(b)(2)(emphasis added). 
63 Arthur Hellman, et al., Neutralizing the Stratagem of “Snap Removal”:  A Proposed Amendment to the Judicial 
Code, 9 FED. CTS. L. REV. 103 (2016).  The basic purpose of the 1948 “and served” language is agreed upon by 
commentators although they may differ in their views of the propriety of snap removal.  See, e.g., Saurabh 
Vishnubhakat, Pre-Service Removal in the Forum Defendant’s Arsenal, 47 GONZ. L. REV. 147 (2011-2012)(finding 
snap removal appropriate because of plain language of “and served” requirement despite tension with purpose of the 
language); Matthew Curry, Note, Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand Denied: Arguing for Pres-Service Removal under 
the Plain Language of the Forum-Defendant Rule, 58 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 907 (2010)(same); Jordan Bailey, 
Comment:  Giving State Courts the Ol’ Slip:  Should a Defendant be Allowed to Remove an Otherwise Irremovable 
Case to Federal Court Solely Because Removal was Made Before Any Defendant is Served?, 42 TEX. TECH L. REV. 
181 (2009)(criticizing snap removal as inconsistent with overall structure of removal and diversity jurisdiction).   
This appears to be the judicial consensus as well, even for judges permitting snap removal.  See, e.g., 
Brown v. Organon USA Inc., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50179, 2008 WL 2625355, at *7 (D.N.J.); Allen v. 
GlaxoSmithKline PLC, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42491, 2008 WL 2247067, at *6 (E.D.Pa.); Brown v. Organon 
Intern. Inc., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55490, 2008 WL 2833294, at **4-5 (D.N.J.); DeAngelo-Shuayto, 2007 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 92557, 2007 WL 4365311, at *1; Stan Winston Creatures, Inc. v. Toys "R" US, Inc., 314 F. Supp. 2d 
177, 181 (S.D.N.Y.); Holmstrom v. Harad, No. 05-2714, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16694, 2005 WL 1950672, at *2 
(N.D.Ill.); Aredia and Zometa Products Liability Litigation, No. 07-0779, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14608, 2007 WL 
2905247, at *2 (M.D.Tenn.).  See also John P. Lavelle, Jr. & Erin E. Kepplinger, Removal Prior to Service: a New 
Wrinkle or a Dead End?, 75 DEF. COUNSEL J. 177 (Winter 2008)(defense lawyer attracted to snap removal as a 
tactic recognizes split in opinion and tension between “and served” text and its purpose of preventing plaintiff 
gamesmanship without vitiating forum defendant rule resulting in divided trial court decisions).        
64 See Nannery, supra note 7, at 548:  “historical context makes [the service language’s] purpose evident: ‘The 
purpose behind the addition of that language seems fairly clear – to bring into the statute the ‘fraudulent joinder’ 
doctrine and to restrict other tactics, like failing to serve a properly joined in-state defendant, which might otherwise 
be used to prevent removals which Congress had authorized.” (quoting Champion Chrysler Plymouth v. Dimension 
Service Corp., 2017 WL 726943 at *2 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 24, 2017), adopting Report & Recommendation 2017 WL 
1276727 (S.D. Ohio April 6, 2017), appeal dismissed, No. 17-3355 (6th Cir. June 12, 2017). 
 The fraudulent joinder doctrine holds that defendants against whom the plaintiff has no plausible claim will 
be ignored in determining whether there exists complete diversity and corresponding federal diversity jurisdiction 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1332.  See In re Briscoe, 448 F.3d 201, 216 (3d Cir. 2006).  But see Abels v. State Farm Fire 
& Cas. Co., 770 F.2d 26, 32 (3d Cir. 1985)(plaintiff’s motive of joining forum defendant to defeat diversity 
jurisdiction is not fraudulent joinder unless plaintiff lacks legitimate basis for claim against forum defendant).  See 
generally James E. Pfander, Forum Shopping and the Infrastructure of Federalism, 17 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. 
REV. 355 (2008)(defending forum shopping against common criticisms and noting that practice may enhance 
federalism and relative importance of state judicial systems). 
65 See 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1948) reviser's notes; H.R. Rep. No. 80-308 (1947), as reprinted in 1948 U.S.C.C.S., 
Special Pamphlet: Title 28 at 1692; S. Rep. No. 80-1559 (1948), as reprinted in 1948 U.S.C.C.S. Special Pamphlet: 
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removal, discussed below, has been slow in coming because of the limited reviewability of 
remand motions.66   
 
Despite the lack of guidance, it seems clear that the "properly joined and served" 
requirement of §1441(b) was not intended to vitiate the forum defendant rule but rather was 
designed to prevent the naming of non-legitimate defendants from preventing removal.  Though 
the legislative history behind §1441(b) is cloudy, the generally accepted view is that Congress 
added the “properly joined and served” limitation to prevent plaintiffs from blocking removal by 
joining forum defendants they don’t intend to serve or pursue.67 Whatever the rationale for the 
1948 Amendment to the removal statute, it seems clear that Congress did not intend to constrict 
the forum defendant rule, to make it more easily evaded, or to elevate the significance of the 
timing of service.    
 
In Pullman Co. v. Jenkins,68 which remanded a case removed by an initially unserved 
“Doe” defendant who was later identified as a citizen of the forum state (California).  The Court 
invalidated the removal, stating that “the non-resident defendant should not be permitted to seize 
an opportunity to remove the cause before service upon the resident co-defendant is effected.”69  
But the unserved forum defendant in that case also destroyed complete diversity, making the 
precedential impact of the case unclear. 
 
Despite this, one extensive and influential trial court opinion70 read Pullman v. Jenkins as 
probative of a judicial understanding of legislative intent that implicitly disapproved of snap 
removal.  Although this approach creates the possibility that a defendant will be joined solely to 
defeat removal without any genuine plaintiff intent to seek relief from the forum defendant, the 
Pullman v. Jenkins Court seemed untroubled by risk, reasoning that a "the resident defendant 
[that] has not been joined in good faith” could be disregarded for purposes of determining the 
availability of removal.71    
 
Although this seems the right approach, it obviously holds the door ajar to improper 
naming of sham defendants by plaintiffs solely to defeat removal rather than to actually pursue 
                                                                                                                                                                              
Title 28, 1675; Letter from Hon. Albert B. Maris, Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals  for the Third 
Circuit, and Chair of the Committee, to Mildrim Thompson, Jr., Esq. (May 10, 1946). 
66 Cook v. Wikler, 320 F.3d 431, 438-39 (3d Cir. 2003)(orders denying or permitting remand generally not 
reviewable). 
67 See Sullivan v. Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corp., 575 F. Supp. 2d 640, 645 (D.N.J. 2008) (“Congress added the 
‘properly joined and served’ requirement in order to prevent a plaintiff from blocking removal by joining as a 
defendant a resident party against whom it does not intend to proceed, and whom it does not even serve.”); Stan 
Winston Creatures, Inc. v. Toys “R” Us, Inc., 314 F. Supp. 2d 177, 181 (S.D. N.Y. 2003) (“The purpose of the 
‘joined and served’ requirement is to prevent a plaintiff from blocking removal by joining as a defendant a resident 
party against whom it does not intend to proceed, and whom it does not intend to serve.”); Plymouth v. Dimension 
Service Corp., 2017 WL 726943, *5 (S.D. Ohio 2017) (“The use of the phrase ‘properly joined” in §1441(b)(2) 
stems directly from the judicial development of fraudulent joinder. Why Congress chose to add the words ‘and 
served” to ‘properly joined’ is less clear, although it probably was designed to prevent a plaintiff from defeating 
removal by joining (even properly) an in-state defendant against whom the plaintiff did not intend to proceed.”). 
68 305 U.S. 534 (1939). 
69 Id. 
70 Sullivan v. Novartis Pharms. Corp., 575 F. Supp. 2d 640, 644-45 (D. N.J. 2008). 
71  305 U.S. at 541. 
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claims against a forum state defendant.  Although such improper or “fraudulent” joinder allows a 
court to disregard the naming of the forum defendant,72 proving improper or sham joinder can be 
difficult in practice.  The same plaintiff who is willing to name a sham defendant will probably 
be equally willing to contend that it really intends to pursue the defendant, making it hard as a 
practical matter for courts to police improper/fraudulent joinder in that the process implicitly 
involves a judge concluding that plaintiff’s counsel lacks candor.73   
 
By 1948, “it was clear that the troublesome issue of improper joinder required a less 
muddled solution than merely examining a plaintiff's good faith in naming various forum 
defendants.”74 Congress added the "properly joined and served" requirement in order to prevent a 
                                                      
72  See Pullman Co. v. Jenkins, 303 U.S. 534, 541 (1939); Morris v. Princess Cruises, Inc., 236 F.3d 1061, 1067-68 
(9th Cir. 2001)(non-diverse defendant deemed fraudulently joined when complaint fails to state a viable claim 
against that defendant and other portions of record make clear that joinder was solely attempt to defeat federal 
jurisdiction); Pampillonia v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 138 F.3d 459, 460-61 (2d Cir. 1998)(plaintiff cannot defeat removal 
by naming defendants with no genuine connection to dispute); ; MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 17, 
§§107.52[4](noting that improperly joined parties are generally disregarded in assessing diversity jurisdiction and 
removal).  (addressing fraudulent joinder). 
73 In many cases, of course, the problem is not so stark.  For example, a plaintiff may legitimately sue a forum state 
defendant seeking to hold that defendant liable for its role as an agent of a foreign target defendant but the court may 
rule that for the given cause of action (e.g., bad faith or unfair claims adjusting by an insurer) that agents for a 
disclosed principal are not liable in such cases.  The court can dismiss the claim against the forum state defendant as 
a matter of law without casting aspersions upon the motive of plaintiff’s counsel.   
    In this sense, many of the tactics that defendants decry as “fraudulent joinder” are perfectly reasonable attempts 
by plaintiffs to pursue a culpable individual or entity in the face of adverse doctrine.  Such efforts, even if arguments 
for changes in the law rather than based on current law, should be countenanced by courts.  The liability of 
insurance intermediaries is such an issue.  See Jeffrey W. Stempel, The “Other” Intermediaries:  The Increasingly 
Anachronistic Immunity of Managing General Agents and Independent Claims Adjusters, 15 CONN. INS. L.J. 600 
(2008-2009).  Eventually, such efforts may meet with success.  See id. at 625-30 (noting that minority of 
jurisdictions permit actions against insurer agents).  See, e.g., De Dios v. Indemnity Ins. Co. of No. Am., __ N.W.3d 
__, 2019 Iowa Supp. LEXIS 56 (Iowa May 10, 2019)(majority rejects liability for workers compensation 
intermediary but strong dissent reflects judicial division and possible future success of argument); Halliday v. Great 
Lakes Ins. SE, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 128364 (D. V.I. Aug. 1, 2019)(federal magistrate judge influenced by Iowa 
dissent and scholarly commentary adopts modified version of agent potential liability sufficient to permit further 
discovery). 
     One person’s fraudulent joinder may thus be another’s argument for law reform or willingness to fight an uphill 
doctrinal battle arguing that the instant case is sufficiently different from past precedent to permit liability against 
the forum state defendant.  Although a preference for state court is not lost on plaintiff’s counsel, this does not 
automatically mean that suing a forum state defendant is inevitably a mere tactic for avoiding federal court.  But 
reading defense bar literature, as might many judges, one could certainly be given that impression.  See, e.g., Steven 
Boranian, No “Real Intention to Prosecute” Equals Fraudulent Joinder, DRUG AND DEVICE LAW BLOG (June 8, 
2017), http://www.durganddevicelawblog.com (large firm defense attorney recaps recent federal district court 
decision “that is worth highlighting because it applies a fraudulent joinder standard that we think should apply more 
broadly.  It has always puzzled us why courts are hesitant to find non-diverse or local defendants fraudulently 
joined. . . . [P]laintiffs will frequently name a bogus defendant from . . . the forum state to defeat the defendant’s 
right to remove.”); Jessica Davidson Miller & Milli Kanani Hansen, Fighting Back Fraudulent Joinder in 
Pharmaceutical Drug and Device Cases, RX FOR THE DEFENSE, Vol. 20, Issue No. 1 (April 13, 2012) at 5 (article 
by large law firm attorneys in newsletter of Drug and Medical Device Committee of the Defense Research Institute 
suggests fraudulent joinder occurs with some frequency and outlines techniques for challenge).  See also James M. 
Beck, Third Circuit Green Lights Pre-Service Removal, THE VOICE , Vol. 17, Issue 34 (Sept. 5, 2018) at 6 (large 
firm defense attorney reviews Encompass Insurance v. Stone Mansion, discussed at TAN 114-128, infra, and 
suggests – misleadingly in our view – that pre-service removal has value as a means of fighting fraudulent joinder 
and “litigation tourism.”)     
74 Sullivan v. Novartis Pharms. Corp., 575 F. Supp. 2d 640, 645 (D. N.J. 2008). 
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plaintiff from blocking removal by joining as a defendant a resident party against whom it does 
not intend to proceed, and whom it does not even serve.75  
 
There appears to be no legislative history or other contemporaneous evidence suggesting 
that by adding the service requirement Congress intended to reverse the Jenkins approach of 
barring a defendant from seizing an opportunity to remove a matter by racing to the courthouse 
before service could be made upon a forum defendant.  As one trial court in a particularly 
detailed and reflective opinion concluded, “Congress appears to have added the language only to 
prevent the then-concrete and pervasive problem of improper joinder.”76  The court elaborated:  
 
Indeed, it is inconceivable that Congress, in adding the "properly joined and 
served" language, intended to create an arbitrary means for a forum defendant to 
avoid the forum defendant rule simply by filing a notice of removal before the 
plaintiff is able to effect process. 
 
Defendants argue, unavailingly, that the addition of the language signaled an 
intention by Congress to "narrow this exception to the statutory right of removal." 
There is nothing in the history of the removal doctrine, legislative or otherwise, 
which even suggests why Congress would have intended to limit the forum 
defendant rule. In fact, Congress has never deviated from the "fundamental 
precept of the American court system" that federal jurisdiction is very limited.  
 
Instead, the fact that the legislative history is all but silent on the issue suggests 
that Congress did not intend to address a novel concern or fundamentally change 
the nature of, or narrow the scope of the rule. Indeed, the very lack of discussion 
in the legislative history strongly suggests that Congress intended nothing more 
than to bolster the already existing efforts of lower federal courts to prevent 
improper joinder. 
 
* * * 
 
Congress could not possibly have anticipated the tremendous loophole that would 
one day manifest from technology enabling forum defendants to circumvent the 
forum defendant rule by, inter alia, electronically monitoring state court dockets. 
Thus, Congress would have had no thought to wording the statute with this 
modern problem in mind.77 
 
D. The Mechanics and Machinations of Snap Removal 
 
The typical snap removal scenarios tend to divide into two basic types.  Some are the 
type of race-to-the-courthouse, Flash Boys scenario78 where a defendant with substantial 
                                                      
75 Id. at 645; Stan Winston Creatures, Inc. v. Toys "R" US, Inc., 314 F. Supp. 2d 177, 181 (S.D.N.Y.). 
76 See id. at 645. 
77 Id. at 645 (citations omitted). 
78 As one court has observed, snap removal is reminiscent of the practice of ultra-rapid stock and bond trading 
reflected in MICHAEL LEWIS, FLASH BOYS: A WALL STREET REVOLT (2014)(use of faster communication by better-
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resources (such as a pharmaceutical company) or its counsel is regularly monitoring state court 
dockets.  When a lawsuit against it is discovered – something that happens almost instantly – the 
defendant contacts counsel and seeks to remove as soon as possible.  Removal is sometimes 
accomplished in matter of hours or perhaps even minutes.79  In the meantime, plaintiff may be 
making what would be regarded as reasonable service efforts that are no match for the speed of 
this archetypal snap removal. 
 
A second common scenario is that the defendant, although not monitoring state court 
dockets, is inclined to remove most all cases against it.  Defendant becomes aware of the 
litigation when plaintiff’s counsel requests waiver (or acceptance) of service under state rules or 
after service upon a non-forum defendant.   
 
Here, either a forum or foreign defendant can seek what might be termed “snappish” 
removal by acting quickly but not because of instantaneous docket monitoring.  The non-forum 
defendant knows it is served and from reading the complaint knows that plaintiff has also sued a 
forum state defendant.  A quick check with the co-defendant confirms that plaintiff has yet to 
effect service on it, permitting the non-forum defendant to “stroll” to the courthouse rather than 
race and remove prior to plaintiff’s service upon the forum state defendant, even though plaintiff 
has not been slothful in seeking service. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                              
resourced traders enables “front running” of order placed by investors, which author sees as making U.S. equity 
markets less transparent and democratic and slanted in favor of well-placed insiders).  See Fiskus v. Bristol-Myers 
Squibb Co., 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 141019, 2019 WL 4953610 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 1, 2014) at *5 (“While several 
courts have adhered literally to the statute and allowed pre-service removal by a forum defendant, the Court believes 
that such an interpretion leads to an unintended result, allowing a “Flash Boys” approach to speedy removal to 
override the rule’s purpose.”).;  
Flash Boys examines the practice of traders using their superior technology to buy and sell in mere seconds 
or portions of a seconds faster than others in order to reap market gains that although individually small are 
collectively large – large enough to justify the high cost of fiber optic ultra-fast pipelines for conducting trades.   
As author Lewis and others have concluded, the practice has rather limited socio-economic utility and 
perhaps even more socio-economic cost.  The profits made on flash trading are not really investments in solid 
companies and do not foster long-term growth or wealth of companies, investors, consumers, or society generally.   
Similarly, a snap removal defendant’s success in minimizing liability may add only modestly to the wealth 
of the defendant or its shareholders while causing socio-economic harm to victims of defective products, negligent 
acts or breach of contract due to the reduced levels of success and compensation in federal court.  Alternatively, of 
course, it may be that state courts overcompensate both deserving and undeserving victims, which also damages 
society.   
Answering or even significantly exploring this question is beyond the scope of this article but should 
prompt policymakers to at least be concerned about the variance in preference for forums.  A major rationale of the 
Erie Doctrine was that cases should not be subject to different outcomes depending on whether they are litigated in 
state or federal courts.  See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).  But if despite uniform law cases are 
coming out sufficiently differently in state and federal court as to prompt snap removal and similar tactics, it may be 
time to address and perhaps correct the discrepancy.  
79 In Delaughder v. Colonial Pipeline Co., 360 F.Supp.3d 1372 (N.D. Ga. 2018), the plaintiffs filed their complaint 
at 11:50 a.m., plaintiffs unsuccessfully attempted service at 12:26 p.m., and defendants filed their notice of removal 
in the federal district court at 1:15 p.m. Defendants knew this case was coming because an earlier action—which 
had also been snap-removed—was voluntarily dismissed without prejudice (on permission of the federal court).  
Although the trial court later remanded this “Flash Boys”-style snap removal, other plaintiffs in similar situations 
have been less fortunate. 
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In these cases where removal is not as rapid as in the Flash Boys scenario, the plaintiffs 
are of course a bit less sympathetic.  They could perhaps have made more diligent efforts at 
service contemporaneous to filing or have structured service of process to ensure that forum 
defendants are the first defendants served.  Though a trap for the unwary, one can criticize 
plaintiffs’ counsel for falling into it.80  But even if plaintiffs are not as conscientious (and 
adversarial-cum-paranoid) about service matters as they should be, snap removal of a case that 
should never have been in federal court seems an inordinate price to pay. 
 
Plaintiff may also have telegraphed its punch by alerting defendants to the coming suit or 
they have been constructively warned because of settlement overtures.  Here, we think there 
should be some sympathy for plaintiffs beaten to the removal “punch.”  Although fans of tricky, 
cloak-and-dagger lawyering may prefer quick strike lawsuits that prevent or at least discourage 
snap removal, the public policy favoring informal dispute resolution and its attendant consensual 
nature and conservation of resources would presumably auger in favor of talking settlement 
before suit even at the risk of forewarning an opponent and losing the element of surprise in 
litigation.  At the very least, it would seem inapt for plaintiffs seeking informal settlement prior 
to litigation to be punished via snap removal. 
 
In addition to the perhaps expected capacity of sophisticated litigants to race to the 
courthouse, the particular service protocols of some states delay service and expand defendant 
removal opportunities.  Some states, perhaps most prominently New York and New Jersey, 
require a plaintiff commencing a civil action by court filing to obtain a civil action number prior 
to serving the defendants.81  This often requires several days, particularly if a complaint is filed 
on a Thursday or Friday because the clerks’ offices will not be assigning numbers over a 
weekend.   
 
In these situations, even the most diligent plaintiff wishing to remain in state court and 
ready to do so with expeditious service on a forum state defendant is effectively precluded from 
winning the race to the courthouse.  Although one might advise plaintiff counsel in these states 
to file on a Monday, this would hardly permit plaintiffs to have a reasonable chance of effecting 
service prior to removal.  Even a half-day wait for assignment of a case number from the clerk’s 
office leaves plaintiffs in the dust of snap removers.82   
 
                                                      
80 After having become familiar with the problem through our research, we would advise plaintiff’s counsel to give 
the same attention to the structure, means, and ordering of service of process as is devoted to higher profile 
endeavors such as initial case evaluation, complaint drafting, and motion practice.   
81 See, e.g., N.J. R. Civ. P. 4:5A-2 (requiring issuance of a “Track Assignment Notice” by the clerk of court before 
plaintiff may serve a filed complaint upon a defendant; clerk has 10-day deadline for issuing notice); N.Y. Civ. P. L 
& R 304 & 306-a (after filing of summons and complaint and payment of filing fee, clerk of court must issue and 
“index number” to plaintiff before process may be served); Pa. R. Civ. P. 400(a)(“original process shall be served 
with the Commonwealth only by the sheriff” who has 30 days in which to effect service).      
82 This might be a good time to ask why in the world a clerk’s office operating in the 21st Century is not able to 
provide plaintiffs with a case tracking number immediately upon filing of the complaint.  Government bureaucracy 
already has a bad enough name without becoming an instrument whereby one class of litigants takes advantage of 
another group of litigants.  But even this mythical well-run clerk’s office instantaneously assigning case numbers 
would probably not be fast enough to thwart the best equipped snap removers. 
20 
 
Conversely, states that commence litigation with service rather than court filing (e.g., 
Minnesota)83 effectively eliminate the practice of snap removal so long as the plaintiff makes 
sure to serve the forum defendant first or contemporaneously with service upon non-forum 
defendants.84  In addition, state protocols for service, including “long-arm” jurisdictional service, 
may decrease plaintiff’s odds of resisting snap removal.85 
 
Procedurally, decisions about the propriety of snap removal emerge when the trial court 
rules on a motion to remand after the defendant has already accomplished the removal, which 
does not require court consent.  Remand, however, requires a court order and thus becomes the 
first (and often the only) reflective judicial evaluation of the snap removal maneuver.86   
 
E.  The Strange Career of Snap Removal 
 
 As discussed above, the 1948 Amendment to the removal statute added the “properly 
joined and served” language.  But it took roughly three decades before forum state defendants 
found that they could potentially exploit the language, in large part by exploiting electronic 
docket monitoring that gave defendants with sufficient resources (and fear of being sued in state 
court)87 the ability to run to the courthouse with a removal petition faster than even a diligent 
plaintiff could effect service after filing a complaint in state court.88 
                                                      
83 See Minn. R. Civ. P. 3.01, 4.04 (action commenced by service on defendant).   
84 Here again is an area where some of the problem may well be of plaintiff’s counsel’s own making.  In a state like 
Minnesota, attorneys seeking to sue in state court and stay in state court would presumably have a standing rule that 
its process servers will always serve a forum defendant first.  But failure to adopt these or similar practices should 
not in our view justify permitting removal of a case that according to the purpose of diversity jurisdiction and 
removal should not be tried in federal court. 
85 For example, a long-arm statute may provide for service via mailing sent through the secretary of state or similar 
officer.  If a state requires filing prior to service as well, there regularly will be a several-day gap between the time 
of filing and the time of service – more than enough time to effect pre-service snap removal. 
86 See MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 17, §107.151; COLEMAN ET AL., supra note 1, at 76-77. 
87 We do not want to be indifferent to the practical problems faced by American businesses.  Even a well-run 
organization providing valuable, even life-saving, goods and services is going to be sued.  The entire industry of 
commercial general liability insurance is premised on this reality.  See generally RANDY MANILOFF & JEFFREY 
STEMPEL, GENERAL LIABILITY INSURANCE COVERAGE: KEY ISSUES IN EVERY STATE Ch. 1 (4th ed. 2018); JEFFREY 
W. STEMPEL & ERIK S. KNUTSEN, STEMPEL & KNUTSEN ON INSURANCE COVERAGE Ch. 14 (4th ed. 2016). 
     And as entities seeking to maximize shareholder value, we understand that businesses (or their liability insurers 
that will eventually defend claims and pay settlements and judgments) would rather pay less than more.  
Consequently, moving from state courts viewed as pro-plaintiff to federal courts viewed as pro-defendant is 
understandable. 
      Nonetheless, if one moves beyond a narrow legal, tactical analysis, one might ask what it means that some 
companies are such magnets for lawsuits that it is worth the expense of docket monitoring and having lawyers on 
retainer for seeking removal with a speed normally reserved for Jimmy John’s sandwich delivery.  Unless in-house 
counsel is hiring the docket-monitoring company as a favor for a friend or getting kickbacks, this means the 
company is getting sued often enough to establish a snap removal infrastructure.  Although this might provide 
support for pro-defendant critics of a “litigation explosion,” it could also mean that the defendant has become a 
lawsuit magnet by frequently doing things wrong.  Perhaps federal court adjudication is not providing sufficient 
deterrence and should not be fostered by judicial friendliness to snap removal. 
88 As discussed further in our data analysis, some snap removals do not have to be particularly snappy to succeed 
because plaintiffs are not always swiftly effecting service.  In some cases, for reasons that bewilder us, plaintiffs are 
downright slow in effecting service – something that should never happen if a plaintiff is serious about remaining in 
state court.  In this subset of snap removal cases, we acknowledge plaintiffs are far less sympathetic than in cases 
where docket monitoring and removal within an hour beats a diligent plaintiff’s service later in the day or within the 
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 Because the “forum defendant rule applies only at the time the notice of removal is 
filed”89 the language of 28 U.S.C. §1441(b)(2) can be read to permit removal prior to joinder and 
service of the forum state defendant.  As noted in a leading treatise, “[t]he actual language of the 
forum defendant rule would seem to permit such removal” but “that literal interpretation would 
enable gamesmanship by defendants who, by monitoring the state docket and removing actions 
to federal court before the plaintiff has a chance to serve the forum defendant, could always 
avoid the rule.”90  Consequently, the conventional wisdom prior to the traction snap removal has 
gained in recent years was “to apply the forum defendant rule even when the forum defendant 
has not yet been served.”91 
 
             Prior to 1990, defendant efforts to remove prior to service were rare.92  The tactic is first 
touched upon in passing by an appellate court in 2001.93  Beginning in 2007, snap removal 
efforts began to increase, undoubtedly in significant part because of the increased availability of 
real time electronic docket monitoring that permitted defendants in many states to realize they 
had been sued prior to being served.   
 
Snap removal initially met with resistance by many trial courts that took the position that 
the “and served” requirement did not change the basic rule that the presence of a forum state 
defendant destroyed complete diversity and prevented removal.94  As noted above, one leading 
                                                                                                                                                                              
same week that the complaint was filed.  In slow service cases, snap removal does not have the same degree of 
tricky gamesmanship in which a defendant with substantial resources takes advantage of plaintiff’s fewer resources.  
However, snap removal is equally inappropriate in these cases so long as the sloth of slow service does not reflect 
improper, unjustified suit against the forum defendant merely for procedural advantages.  However, rather then 
permitting snap removal, we would prefer that such cases be addressed pursuant to improper joinder doctrine. 
89 MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 17, §107.55[2] at 107-108. 
90 MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 17, §107.55[2] at 107-108. 
91 MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 17, §107.55[2] at 107-108, citing as an exemplar and accurate collection 
of precedent Ethington v. General Electric Co., 575 F. Supp. 2d 855, 860-64 (N.D. Ohio 2008)(collecting cases and 
following Treatise’s perceived trend of “prohibiting removal by unserved forum defendant”). 
92 See, e.g., Recognition Communications, Inc. v. American Auto. Ass’n., Inc., 1998 WL 119528 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 5, 
1998). 
93 See McCall v. Scott, 239 F.3d 808, 813 n. 2 (6th Cir. 2001).  See also Texas Brine v. American Arbitration 
Association, __ F.3d __, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 10849 (5th Cir. April 7, 2020)(citing McCall v. Scott as implicitly 
earliest federal circuit court discussion in which “[t]he Sixth Circuit in a footnote also interpreted Section 1441(b)(2) 
to allow snap removal).  Because the McCall v. Scott footnote is so cursory, we are reluctant to treat it as a 
considered discussion of the topic.  In our view, snap removal did not receive serious appellate court examination 
until 2018.  See TAN 114-138, infra (discussing three federal appeals court decisions that have assessed 
permissibility of snap removal). 
94 See, e.g., Little v. Wyndham Worldwide Operations, Inc., 251 F. Supp. 3d 1215, 1218-23 (M.D. Tenn. 
2017)(remanding after analysis concluding that snap removal is contrary to congressional intent and larger purpose 
of forum defendant rule); Confer v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 61 F. Supp. 3d 305, 306 (S.D.N.Y. 2014)(remand 
after removal by non-forum defendant prior to service on forum defendant);  Lone Mountain Ranch, LLC v. Santa 
Fe Gold Corp., 988 F. Supp. 2d 1263, 1266-1267 (D. N.M. 2013)(noting division of authority but remanding, 
finding that forum defendant rule cannot be circumvented by snap removal unless there is fraudulent joinder of 
forum defendant or plaintiff was “dilatory” in failing to accomplish service); Perez v. Forest Labs., Inc. 902 F. Supp. 
2d 1238, 1242-46 (E.D. Mo. 2012)(finding snap removal inconsistent with basic purposes of removal and forum 
defendant rule): Ethington v. General Electric Co., 575 F. Supp. 2d 855, 860-64 (N.D. Ohio 2008)(Vivas v. Boeing 
Co., 486 F. Supp. 2d 726, 734 (N.D. Ill. 2007) (finding snap removal to frustrate congressional intend and 
“consistent efforts of both Congress and the courts to determine diversity jurisdiction based on the genuine interest 
of the parties to the controversy”). 
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treatise describes remand of snap removals to be the majority rule and trend.95   However, a 
substantial number of trial courts have taken a “plain language” approach to the service 
requirement and ruled that removal was proper if effected before service upon forum state 
defendants.96   
 
In a forthcoming article we describe the evolution of the case law from 1991 forward. 
Although there are no dramatic trends or spikes over this 30-year period, the removal rate for 
snap removals was consistently above 50% nationwide for the years through 2013. The 
nationwide removal rate then stayed below 50% through 2018. And it has since returned to rates 
above 50% again. Although the district courts were roughly evenly divided on the issue, district 
courts in the Second, Third and Fifth Circuits are now bound by precedent.97 
 
It was not until Fall 2018 that an appellate court discussed the propriety of snap removal 
at any length.98  This was followed by a Spring 2019 appellate decision99 and a Spring 2020 
panel decision.100  These three decisions took a highly textualist approach supporting snap 
removal,101 arguably shifting the tide – regrettably in our view (on both substantive and 
jurisprudential grounds) – in favor of snap removal.  In the absence of countervailing appellate 
precedent in the near future, this shift may become established doctrine.  However, the 
circumstances, rationale and outcome of the circuit court decisions to date provide a weak reed 
for supporting snap removal.  
 
II. Unfortunate Appellate Approval of a Tainted Tactic 
 
A.  The Stone Mansion Litigation: Following Text; Permitting Trickery; Soft-
Pedaling History and Legislative Intent 
 
In Encompass Insurance, Inc. v. Stone Mansion Restaurant, Inc.,102 the Third Circuit 
became the first appellate court to gain wide attention ruling on the propriety of snap removal.  
The case arose out of a single vehicle rollover that killed the intoxicated driver and seriously 
injured his sole passenger as they were leaving an event at Stone Mansion, a Pittsburgh 
restaurant.  The decedent driver (Brian Viviani) was intoxicated, having consumed substantial 
amounts of alcohol at the event.  The passenger (Helen Hoey) sued the driver’s estate, which 
                                                      
95 See MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 17, §107.55[2]. 
96 See, e.g., Graff v. Leslie Hindman Auctioneers, Inc., 299 F. Supp. 3d 928, 933-38 (N.D. Ill. 2017); Regal Stone 
Ltd. v. Longs Drug Stores, Cal., L.L.C., 881 F. Supp. 2d 1123, 1127-29 (N.D. Cal. 2012); Watanabe v. Lankford, 
684 F. Supp. 2d 1210, 1219 (D. Haw. 2010); North v. Precision Airmotive Corp., 600 F. Supp. 2d 1263, 1268 (M.D. 
Fla. 2009). 
97 See Thomas O. Main, Jeffrey W. Stempel & David McClure, The Elastics of Snap Removal: Empirically 
Assessing a Troublesome Judicial Divide (Otober 2019)(unpublished manuscript on file with authors). 
98 See Encompass Insurance, Inc. v. Stone Mansion Restaurant, Inc., 902 F.3d 147 (3d Cir. 2018)(decided in August 
2018). 
99 See Gibbons v. Bristol-Myers Co., 902 F.3d 147 (2d Cir. 2019)(involving drug product liability claims; 
substantive law unclear)(decided in March 2019). 
100 See Texas Brine v. American Arbitration Association, __ F.3d __, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 10849 (5th Cir. April 7, 
2020). 
101 See TAN 114-128, infra (discussing Stone Mansion); TAN 129-132, infra (discussing Gibbons v. Bristol-Myers 
Co.), TAN 133-138, infra (discussing Texas Brine). 
102 902 F.3d 147 (3d Cir. 2018)(applying Pennsylvania substantive law). 
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tendered defense of the matter to Encompass, the insurer of the vehicle, which paid $600,000 for 
a settlement that included a release of “her claims against all possible defendants.”103   
 
Encompass, an Illinois citizen, then sought recovery in Pennsylvania state court against 
Stone Mansion, a Pennsylvania corporation asserting a variety of claims based on Pennsylvania 
law, most prominently a dram shop action104 and one for contribution by a joint tortfeasor 
pursuant to Pennsylvania’s version of the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act 
(“UCATA”).105   
 
This classic example of a case that does not belong in federal court because of the forum 
defendant rule, the action was nonetheless successfully removed when Stone Mansion took 
advantage of a miscue by Encompass counsel, which notified the restaurant of its intent to sue.  
“In email correspondence between counsel for Encompass and for Stone Mansion, counsel for 
Stone Mansion agreed to accept electronic service of process instead of requiring formal 
service.”106 This form of service was routine under Pennsylvania state practice and procedure. 
After receipt of the complaint, Stone Mansion counsel then refrained from accepting service and 
instead sought removal.  Thus, according to both the district and circuit courts “Stone Mansion 
timely removed the matter” prior to service.107   
 
Although it had not exactly raced to the courthouse after constant monitoring of the 
docket in the manner of a pharmaceutical company, Stone Mansion had achieved a slow-rolling 
snap removal (a “sag” removal?) by essentially conning plaintiff counsel into letting down its 
guard and forgoing immediate personal service.108  The trial court denied the Encompass motion 
for remand and ruled for Stone Mansion on the merits via a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.109 Although 
                                                      
103 Stone Mansion, 902 F.3d at 149. 
104 Dram shop laws, found in more than 40 states, make commercial servers of alcohol (and sometimes social hosts 
as well) liable for serving excessive amounts of alcohol to impaired patrons who subsequently cause injury.  Some 
states, like Pennsylvania, permit an action only be victims of the intoxicated driver.  The bulk of states, however, 
permit actions by the patron as well.  See generally Jeffrey W. Stempel, Making Liquor Immunity Worse:  Nevada’s 
Undue Protection of Commercial Hosts Evicting Vulnerable and Dangerous Patrons, 14 NEV. L. J. 866 (2014).   
105 UCATA generally provides, as does Pennsylvania’s adoption of the model law, a methodology for apportioning 
the respective liability of tortfeasors. 
106 Stone Mansion, 902 F.3d at 150. 
107 Stone Mansion, 902 F.3d at 150. 
108  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(describing process for waiver of service of process to “avoid unnecessary expenses of 
serving the summons” and providing that plaintiff may notify a defendant “that an action has been commenced and 
requires that the defendant waive service of as summons.”  In addition to being a good litigation citizen, the waiving 
defendant need not answer for 60 days as compared to the 20-day deadline for answering a complaint served via 
summons.  In addition, the defendant is provided “a reasonable time of at least 30 days after the request was sent . . . 
to return the waiver.”  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(d)(1)(F).   
The waiver of service provisions of Rule 4 were promulgated in 1993 and reflect not only the modern legal 
system’s encouragement of cooperation and efficiency but also strongly suggest that snap removal is inconsistent 
with modern service of process rules.  If the federal rule makers involved in the creation of Rule 4(d) – the Civil 
Rules Advisory Committee, a Standing Committee on Practice and Procedure, the Judicial Conference of the United 
States, and the U.S. Supreme Court – had been aware of the prospect of pre-service removal by a forum defendant, it 
is unlikely they would have issued a service of process rule that could so easily be exploited to achieve such removal 
and evade the forum defendant rule.  This makes the Stone Mansion panel’s lack of outrage at the conduct of 
defense counsel all the more puzzling. 
109 Stone Mansion, 902 F.3d at 150; Encompass Ins. v. Stone Mansion Rest., Inc., 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS; 2017 WL 
664318 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 16, 2017).  The trial court found as a matter of law that Encompass, standing in the shoes of 
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the case was reversed and remanded on other grounds, the district court’s allowance of snap 
removal was affirmed by the Third Circuit.110 
 
Regarding the propriety of snap removal, the Third Circuit affirmed the trial court view – 
and followed the trial court’s heavily textualist approach in spite of defense counsel’s clever-
cum-deceitful lulling of plaintiff counsel into complacency regarding prompt service of process.  
The panel was “unconvinced that Stone Mansion’s conduct – even if unsavory – precludes it 
from arguing that incomplete service permits removal.”111 
 
 With Stone Mansion deemed incompletely served/unserved, the appellate panel applied 
the literal language of 28 U.S.C. §1441(b)(2). 
 
Where federal jurisdiction is premised only on diversity of the parties, the forum 
defendant rule applies.  That rule provides that “[a] civil action otherwise 
removable solely on the basis of [diversity jurisdiction] may not be removed if 
                                                                                                                                                                              
the intoxicated patron driver, could not recover under the Pennsylvania Dram Shop law, which recognized only 
claims by those injured by an intoxicated patron and not the patrons themselves.  
 
The plain, unambiguous reading of [the dram shop law] indicates that a licensee, such as Stone 
Mansion, is liable only to third persons (Hoey in this case), for damages inflicted upon the third 
person - off the licensee's premises - by a customer of the licensee ([intoxicated driver] Viviani in 
this case), but only when the licensee furnishes that customer (Viviani) with alcohol when he was 
visibly intoxicated. [The law], with its limited scope, indicates that Stone Mansion may have been 
liable to Hoey — depending upon whether Stone Mansion served Viviani alcohol while he was 
visibly intoxicated. Encompass' Complaint establishes that Encompass is acting as if it were 
Viviani in order to recover under Pennsylvania's Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act. 
Because [there] is no potential cognizable claim under [the law] as between Viviani/Encompass 
and Stone Mansion, there is likewise no claim for contribution, and thus, Stone Mansion's Motion 
to Dismiss will be granted. 
 
See id. at *15-*16 (emphasis in original). 
110 Stone Mansion, 902 F.3d at 151. The appellate court reversed and remanded the case on the issue of tortfeasor 
contribution, 902 F.3d at 154-56. but that is not relevant here.  
111 Stone Mansion, 902 F.3d at 154.  The trial court characterized Encompass as arguing that Stone Mansion was 
“precluded” from seeking snap removal because of its conduct regarding promised voluntary acceptance of service. 
The use of preclusion terminology, which can cause confusion regarding exactly what is meant (e.g, claim 
preclusion; issue preclusion; some kindred doctrine; a layperson’s understanding that certain conduct or statements 
logically should preclude one from taking inconsistent positions or saying inconsistent things) and may reflect 
problematic lawyering by Encompass counsel more than mischaracterization by the trial court.  It clearly appears to 
us that Encompass was asserting equitable estoppel based on purportedly reasonable detrimental reliance on Stone 
Mansion’s assurances as well as a type of unclean hands argument based on purported misconduct by Stone 
Mansion counsel.   
Had this issue been properly recognized by the four judges hearing the case (presumably with some help by 
plaintiff counsel), a more enlightened discussion may have ensued.  Instead, the Third Circuit, while stating it was 
“mindful” of professional conduct rules prohibiting lawyers from “engag[ing] in conduct involving dishonesty, 
fraud, deceit or misrepresentation” [quoting Pa. R. Prof. Conduct 8.4 that is modeled on ABA R. Prof. Conduct 8.4], 
the court rather cavalierly declared that it “need not pass judgment on whether Stone Mansion violated this rule, 
because Encompass has failed to provide any support for the proposition that Stone Mansion’s conduct carried 
preclusive effect,” [902 F.3d at 154] introducing uncertainty as to whether the Court (with some misleading “help” 
from Encompass) was applying the rather strict standards of collateral estoppel to the issue rather than the more apt 
and more easily satisfied elements of equitable estoppel (a misleading statement or conduct inducing reasonable 
detrimental reliance). 
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any of the parties in interest properly joined and served as defendants is a citizen 
of the State in which such action is brought.” [citing the statute]. 
 
When interpreting a statute, we “must begin with the statutory text” [as it] is well-
established that “[w]here the text of a statute is unambiguous, the statute should 
be enforced as written and only the most extraordinary showing of contrary 
intentions in the legislative history will justify a departure from the language.” 
Nevertheless, it is also a “basic tenet of statutory construction . . . that courts 
should interpret a law to avoid absurd or bizarre results.” An absurd interpretation 
is one that “defies rationality or renders the statute nonsensical and superfluous.” 
 
Starting with the text, we conclude that the language of the forum defendant rule 
in section 1441(b)(2) is unambiguous.  Its plain meaning precludes removal on 
the basis of in-state citizenship only when the defendant has been properly joined 
and served.  Thus, it remains for us to determine whether there has been a “most 
extraordinary showing of contrary intentions” and consider whether this literal 
interpretation leads to absurd or bizarre results.”112 
 
 The Third Circuit panel did examine the legislative history of the “properly joined and 
served” statutory language but did so in relatively cursory fashion. 
 
Section 1441 exists in part to prevent favoritism for in-state litigants and 
discrimination against out-of-state litigants.  The specific purpose of the “properly 
joined and served” language in the forum defendant rule is less obvious.  The 
legislative history provides no guidance; however, courts and commentators have 
determined that Congress enacted the rule “to prevent a plaintiff from blocking 
removal by joining as a defendant a resident party against whom it does not intend 
to proceed, and whom it does not even serve.113 
 
 Rejecting Encompass’s argument that plaintiff gamesmanship in naming what might be 
termed sham or “Potemkin”114 defendants is best addressed as a matter of fraudulent joinder 
                                                      
112 Stone Mansion, 902 F.3d at 152 (citations omitted). 
113 Stone Mansion, 902 F.3d at 153 (citations omitted).  See Arthur Hellman, et al., Neutralizing the Strategem of 
“Snap Removal”: A Proposed Amendment to the Judicial Code, 9 FED. CTS. L. REV. 103 (2016)(viewing history of 
removal statute and joinder and service requirement in this manner).  Despite agreeing with the article’s  legislative 
history assessment, which was also shared by a notable trial court decision within the Circuit that rejected snap 
removal (e.g., Sullivan v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 575 F. Supp.2d 640, 645 (D. N.J. 2008), the Stone Mansion court 
did not consider the interpretative principle positing that where Congress amends a statute without express 
discussion of a change in the law – as took place with the 1948 and 2011 amendments of the removal statutes – 
courts should be reluctant to read new statutory verbiage too broadly and thereby alter a status quo that Congress did 
not intend to change.  
114 The term “Potemkin Village,” is so named for Grigory Potemkin, a Russian minister who purportedly used the 
tactic of false building facades designed to convince Catherine the Great that her newly acquired lands were settled 
and prosperous rather than barren or war-ravaged.  Today, the term is used to mean a deception designed to make a 
situation look better or more genuine than its reality.  See MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/Potemkin%20village (“an impressive façade or show designed to hide an undesirable fact or 
condition.”); NORMAN DAVIES, EUROPE: A HISTORY 658 (2010)[Random House ISBN 978-1-4070-9179-2].  See 
also United States v. Massachusetts, 781 F. Supp. 2d 1, 22, n. 25 (D. Mass. 2011)(“The affidavit is the Potemkin 
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doctrine, the Circuit panel found that “Congress’ inclusion of the phrase ‘properly joined and 
served’ addresses the problem of fraudulent joinder “with a bright-line rule” that deserved literal 
enforcement. 
 
Permitting removal on the facts of this case does not contravene the apparent 
purpose to prohibit that particular tactic.  Our interpretation does not defy 
rationality or render the statue nonsensical or superfluous, because: (1) it abides 
by the plain meaning of the text; (2) it envisions a broader right of removal only 
in the narrow circumstances where a defendant is aware of an action prior to 
service of process with sufficient time to initiate removal; and (3) it protects the 
statute’s goal without rendering any of the language unnecessary.  [While] this 
result may be peculiar in that it allows Stone Mansion to use pre-service 
machinations to remove a case that it otherwise could not . . ., the outcome is not 
so outlandish as to constitute an absurd or bizarre result.115 
 
B. Gibbons v. Bristol-Myers Squibb:  Similar Refusal to Recognize the Flaws of 
Snap Removal 
 
 Less than six months after Stone Mansion, defendants seeking snap removal gained 
another supportive appellate decision in Gibbons v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co.116   Plaintiff 
Catherine Gibbons sued drug makers Bristol-Myers and Pfizer over alleged defects and dangers 
                                                                                                                                                                              
Village of today’s litigation landscape.  Purported adjudication by affidavit is like walking down a street between 
two movie sets, all lawyer-painted façade and no interior architecture.”). 
115 Stone Mansion, 902 F.3d at 153-154 (citations and footnote omitted).  For the reasons set forth at TAN    , infra, 
we find this analysis sorely lacking.   
Although absent in the Third Circuit opinion, the trial court’s textualism considered Pennsylvania’s Statutory 
Construction Act regarding the state’s dram shop law.  See 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22396 at *10-*11, which 
provides that 
 
(a) The object of all interpretation and construction of statutes is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the 
General Assembly. Every statute shall be construed, if possible, to give effect to all its provisions. 
(b) When the words of a statute are clear and free from all ambiguity, the letter of it is not to be disregarded 
under the pretext of pursuing its spirit. 
(c) When the words of the statute are not explicit, the intention of the General Assembly may be ascertained by 
considering, among other matters: 
(1) The occasion and necessity for the statute. 
(2) The circumstances under which it was enacted. 
(3) The mischief to be remedied. 
(4) The object to be attained. 
(5) The former law, if any, including other statutes upon the same or similar subjects. 
(6) The consequences of a particular interpretation. 
(7) The contemporaneous legislative history. 
(8) Legislative and administrative interpretations of such statute. 
The trial court did not apply this state Act in its §1441(b)(2) analysis, presumably because it believed in apt 
to use state law in construing a federal statute.  Even though there is not a general federal law of statutory 
construction, there is ample precedent, albeit in our view contradictory precedent with often incorrect analysis. 
116 919 F.2d 699 (2d Cir. 2019).    
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posed by Eliquis (apixaban), a “blood-thinning medication used to reduce the risk of stroke in 
patients with atrial fibrillation.”117 
 
 Oversimplifying the involved procedural history of the claims, we note that Defendants 
Bristol-Myers and Pfizer are both citizens of Delaware by virtue of their incorporation.  After 
some initial lack of success, counsel with new plaintiffs filed in Delaware state court, where the 
matters were quickly removed by defendants prior to service and transferred to an MDL action in 
the Southern District of New York where plaintiffs sought remand to Delaware state court.  The 
trial court denied the motion in what the circuit court described as a pattern of “exemplar” work 
by the trial judge.118 
 
 Addressing the snap removal question, the Second Circuit panel observed that  
 
[g]enerally, any civil suit initiated in state court over which a district court would 
have had original jurisdiction "may be removed by . . . the defendants, to the 
district court of the United States for the district . . . embracing the place where 
such action is pending." . . . But where, as here, the only basis for federal subject-
matter jurisdiction is diversity of citizenship under 28 U.S.C. § 1332, "the forum 
defendant rule applies." [citing Stone Mansion]. Under that rule, which is set out 
at 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)(2), a suit that is "otherwise removable solely on the basis 
of . . . [diversity of citizenship] may not be removed if any of the parties in 
interest properly joined and served as defendants is a citizen of the State in which 
such action is brought." 
                                                      
117 The appellate panel betrayed perhaps a more than a little skepticism about the merits of the claims, which may 
have affected its snap removal analysis, one largely consistent with Stone Mansion but perhaps more conclusory or 
cursory (or “streamlined” for those who approve of the result). 
 
As might be expected, Eliquis increases patients’ risk of bleeding.  To that end, the drug, which 
was approved by the Food and Drug Administration in 2012, carries warnings about the risk of 
serious, and possibly fatal, bleeding events. 
 
Gibbons, 921 F.3d at 702.   
A discussion of the adequacy of prescription drug testing, regulatory approval, adequacy of warnings, and 
direct-to-the-consumer advertising (not permitted in other industrial nations) is of course beyond the scope of this 
paper and a topic on which reasonable persons can disagree.  But we find it a bit disconcerting that the appellate 
panel seems so immediately adverse to the merits of this drug product liability claim when merely tasked with 
deciding the procedural issue of removal. 
That said, large scale complex litigation subject to MDL consolidation may present the most sympathetic 
case for snap removal to the extent it represents defendant desire to remove (by whatever means necessary) in order 
to seek consolidation and case administration efficiency rather than merely a more favorable forum in spite of the 
lack of risk of prejudice against the forum state defendant. 
118 Gibbons, 921 F.3d at 703-04.  And to be fair to the four judges who embraced snap removal in Gibbons and its 
related cases, one can easily describe the tactics of plaintiff counsel as rivalling or surpassing any gamesmanship 
performed by defendants seeking snap removal.  In addition, as stated in the previous note, the Eliquis claims 
appeared to face substantive problems of preemption by federal regulation and general weakness under the 
substantive law in which useful pharmaceutical products are generally subject to ALI, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TORTS §402A, comment k (1965), which provides both a “learned intermediary” defense (prescription by a 
physician notwithstanding that company advertising may have prompted the initial patient inquiry) and a cost-
benefit defense because with the benefits of most drugs inevitably come side effects for some portion of the patients.  
See DAN B. DOBBS, ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS (2d ed 2015).    
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      In the usual case, application of the forum defendant rule is straightforward: a 
defendant is sued in a diversity action in the state courts of its home state, is 
served in accordance with state law, attempts to remove the case, and is rebuffed 
by a district court applying Section 1441(b)(2). Here, however, Defendants 
removed each of the Transferred Actions to federal court after the suit was filed in 
state court but before any Defendant was served. The district court, reasoning 
from the text of the statute, concluded that such removal was proper. Other 
district courts in this Circuit have reached the opposite conclusion. Nevertheless, 
in resolving this split among district courts, we agree with the district court here 
that 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)(2) is no barrier to the removal of the Transferred 
Actions. 
 
      "Every exercise in statutory construction must begin with the words of the 
text." As the Third Circuit — the only other Court of Appeals to address the 
propriety of pre-service removal by a defendant sued in its home state — 
recognized in [Stone Mansion], "the language of the forum defendant rule in 
section 1441(b)(2) is unambiguous." The statute plainly provides that an action 
may not be removed to federal court on the basis of diversity of citizenship once a 
home-state defendant has been "properly joined and served." 28 U.S.C. § 
1441(b)(2) (emphasis added). By its text, then, Section 1441(b)(2) is 
inapplicable until a home-state defendant has been served in accordance with state 
law; until then, a state court lawsuit is removable under Section 1441(a) so long 
as a federal district court can assume jurisdiction over the action. 
 
     In fact, Plaintiffs do not even attempt to argue that the text of Section 
1441(b)(2) supports their position. Instead, Plaintiffs argue that the Court should 
depart from the plain meaning of Section 1441(b)(2) because applying the text of 
the statute (1) produces an absurd result and (2) will lead to non-uniform 
application of the removal statute depending on the provisions of state law. 
Neither argument is persuasive. 
 
"It is, to be sure, well-established that '[a] statute should be interpreted in a way 
that avoids absurd results.'" That being said, a statute is not "absurd" merely 
because it produces results that a court or litigant finds anomalous or perhaps 
unwise. To the contrary, courts should look beyond a statute's text under the 
canon against absurdity "only 'where the result of applying the plain  language 
would be, in a genuine sense, absurd, i.e., where it is quite impossible that 
Congress could have intended the result and where the alleged absurdity is so 
clear as to be obvious to most anyone.'"  
 
     Plaintiffs argue that applying the plain text of Section 1441(b)(2) produces an 
absurd result in light of the overarching purpose of the removal statute, which is 
to allow an out-of-state defendant to escape prejudice in the state courts of the 
plaintiff's home state by ensuring that a fair federal tribunal is available. In light 
of this broad purpose, Plaintiffs frame the forum defendant rule as a carve-out, 
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premised on the understanding that defendants are unlikely to be "home-towned" 
in their home state's courts. Plaintiffs then explain the inclusion of the phrase 
"properly joined and served" as Congress's further recognition that crafty 
plaintiffs might take advantage of the forum defendant rule to secure a state-court 
trial by naming an unnecessary home-state defendant against which they did not 
intend to proceed. Thus, Plaintiffs assert that it is absurd to allow a home-state 
defendant to use an exception meant to protect defendants from unfair bias (in the 
courts of a plaintiff's home state) and language designed to shield them from 
gamesmanship (in the form of fraudulent joinder) to remove a lawsuit to federal 
court. 
 
     Plaintiffs are, of course, correct about the general purposes of the removal 
statute.  But while it might seem anomalous to permit a defendant sued in its 
home state to remove a diversity action, the language of the statute cannot be 
simply brushed aside. Allowing a defendant that has not been served to remove a 
lawsuit to federal court "does not contravene" Congress's intent to combat 
fraudulent joinder. In fact, Congress may well have adopted the "properly joined 
and served" requirement in an attempt to both limit gamesmanship and provide a 
bright-line rule keyed on service, which is clearly more easily administered than a 
fact-specific inquiry into a plaintiff's intent or opportunity to actually serve a 
home-state defendant. Absurdity, then, cannot justify a departure from the plain 
text of the statute. 
 
     Plaintiffs also urge us to look past the language of Section 1441(b)(2) to avoid 
"non-uniform application" of the forum defendant rule based on the vagaries of 
state law service requirements. Plaintiffs are correct that allowing home-state 
defendants to remove on the basis of diversity before they are served might mean 
that defendants sued in some states — those that require a delay between filing 
and service, like Delaware — will be able to remove diversity actions to federal 
court while defendants sued in others — those that permit a plaintiff to serve an 
action as soon as it is filed — will not. But state-by-state variation is not 
uncommon in federal litigation, including in the removal context, and it does not 
follow from the existence of variation that we must look beyond the plain text of 
Section 1441(b)(2). 
 
     Put simply, the result here — that a home-state defendant may in limited 
circumstances remove actions filed in state court on the basis of diversity of 
citizenship — is authorized by the text of Section 1441(b)(2) and is neither absurd 
nor fundamentally unfair. We therefore have no reason to depart from the statute's 
express language and must affirm the district court's denial of Plaintiffs' motions 
to remand.119  
 
Texas Brine:  More Textual Literalism and A Tolerance for the Absurd 
 
                                                      
119 Gibbons, 921 F.3d at 704-07 (citations omitted). 
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In April 2020, the Fifth Circuit joined the Second and Third Circuits in permitting snap 
removal.  Like Stone Mansion and Gibbons, Texas Brine Co., L.L.C. v. American Arbitration 
Association120 took a strongly literal and textualist approach to the “joined and served” language 
of 28 U.S.C. §1441(b)(2).  Plaintiff’s substantive legal case was not particularly compelling121 
and it had (to us) inexplicably elected to serve the AAA (a New York citizen) prior to serving 
either of the two forum defendants in its Louisiana state court action.122  Consequently, AAA’s 
removal was not the Flash Boys scenario seen in cases like the Second Circuit’s Gibbons and 
cases involving drugmakers and other product liability defendants.  AAA did not dash to the 
courthouse.  Texas Brine allowed it to stroll in removing the case to federal court.123 
 
Texas Brine then sought remand but was rebuffed by both the trial court and a unanimous 
Fifth Circuit panel, which took a strong textualist approach that, like other decisions permitting 
snap removal, did not find the results sufficiently odd or incompatible with the forum defendant 
                                                      
120 955 F.3d 482, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 10849 (5th Cir., April 7, 2020). 
121 At least not under the prevailing law of immunity for arbitrators, although the underlying facts appear 
sympathetic to Texas Brine.  It commenced AAA arbitration proceedings in a contract dispute with one of its 
suppliers.  Two of the arbitrators were later discovered to have what Texas Brine regarded as conflicts of interest 
that should have been disclosed prior to their selection.  Although AAA initially refused to replace the arbitrators, 
one of the arbitrators was later removed for cause and the remainder of the panel resigned in the face of continued 
protest by Texas Brine.  See 955 F.3d at ___, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 10849 at *-3-*5. 
          The arbitration proceedings were subsequently vacated, with Texas Brine then seeking reimbursement – from 
AAA and the two allegedly conflicted non-disclosing arbitrators – for its arbitration expenses in a Louisiana state 
court action involving Louisiana plaintiff Texas Brine, New York-based defendant AAA, and the two Louisiana 
arbitrators. 
 In addition to losing its battle to keep the case in state court, discussed in text, Texas Brine lost on the 
merits when the trial and appellate courts rules that the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§1-16, provided the 
exclusive remedy for complaints regarding arbitration proceedings and that the Act did not permit claims for 
damages against individual arbitrators or the AAA tribunal.  The Fifth Circuit tribunal viewed the litigation as an 
impermissible collateral attack on the arbitration in that it alleged grounds that would if proven also justify vacatur. 
See id. at * 10-*18, 955 F.3d at ___.  See also Hall Street Associates, L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576 (2008).  
The trial court also found that the two allegedly conflicted arbitrators enjoyed immunity similar to that of a judge but 
the Fifth Circuit declined to address this issue.  See id. at *11, 955 F.3d at ___. 
122 See id. at * 4, 955 F.3d at ___.  In retrospect, this can only be viewed as a serious mistake.  Although hindsight is 
predictably 20-20, the error is difficult to understand and dilutes sympathy one might otherwise have for a company 
allegedly wronged by a defective arbitral proceeding.  Although Texas Brine’s Louisiana state court action was filed 
in July 2018 – prior to the Third Circuit’s Stone Mansion Decision and the Second Circuit’s Gibbons decision – 
Louisiana federal district courts had by 2018 already consistently permitted snap removal.  See Thomas O. Main et 
al., The Elastics of Snap Removal: Empirically Assessing a Troublesome Judicial Divide (2019)(Manuscript Oct. 
2019)(empirical examination of decisions regarding snap removal and remand; finding more than a dozen Louisiana 
federal trial court cases permitting snap removal).  See, e.g., Leech v. 3M Co., 278 F. Supp. 3d 933 (E.D. La. 
2017)(taking plain language approach to 28 U.S.C. §14419(b)(2) similar to that of Texas Brine panel);  
123 Although the facts of Texas Brine can be distinguished from snap removal stemming from high-tech docket 
monitoring and high-speed removal petitions, the decision nonetheless give a green light to such efforts and has 
attracted the attention of defense counsel ready to take advantage of the new precedent.  See Brittany Wakim, 5th 
Cir. Attys Should Be Ready to File for Removal in A Snap, LAW360 (April 14, 2020)(visited April 14, 2020), 
available at https://www.law360.com/appellate/articles/12646/5th-circ-attys-should-be-ready-to-file-for-removal-in-
a-snap?nl_pk=ce86154f-5637-41d3at49-9f9c. (“What does this mean for practitioners?  In terms of best practice, 
defendants should continue to monitor state court dockets and quickly file notices of removal in cases prior to 
service of a forum defendant.  Where litigation is anticipated, it may be beneficial for a defendants to have removal 
papers, or at least advanced shell removal papers, prepared for anticipated jurisdictions that are read to be filed.”)(“a 
few hours could make the difference in whether the [snap] removal” is successful.). 
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rule to qualify as sufficiently absurd to overcome the literal language of the statute.  The panel 
noted that the issue was one of first impression in that circuit124 but that  
 
Two other circuits have recently interpreted Section 1441(b)(2) as allowing snap 
removal [citing Gibbons and Stone Mansion].  *    *     *  [Further,] 
 
"[W]hen the plain language of a statute is unambiguous and does not lead to an 
absurd result, our inquiry begins and ends with the plain meaning of that 
language."  We look for both plain meaning and absurdity. By Section 
1441(b)(2)'s terms, this case would not have been removable had the forum 
defendants been "properly joined and served" at the time of removal. [Allegedly 
conflicted arbitrator Defendants] and forum state citizens] Minyard and DiLeo 
had not been served, though. When the AAA filed its notice of removal, the case 
was "otherwise removable" — as required by Section 1441(b) — because the 
district court has original jurisdiction of a case initially filed in Louisiana state 
court in which the parties are diverse. § 1441(a); § 1332(a). The forum-defendant 
rule's procedural barrier to removal was irrelevant because the only defendant 
"properly joined and served," the AAA, was not a citizen of Louisiana, the forum 
state. See § 1441(b)(2). We agree with a comment made by the Second Circuit: 
"By its text, then, Section 1441(b)(2) is inapplicable until a home-state defendant 
has been served in accordance with state law; until then, a state court lawsuit is 
removable under Section 1441(a) so long as a federal district court can assume 
jurisdiction over the action."   
 
Texas Brine accepts that the statute's plain language allows snap removal. It 
argues, though, that such a result is absurd and defeats Congress's intent.  Texas 
Brine asserts that Congress added the "properly joined and served" language to 
Section 1441(b)(2) to prevent plaintiffs from naming forum defendants merely for 
the purpose of destroying diversity. That purpose is not served here because 
Texas Brine intended to pursue its claims against the forum defendants. The AAA 
counters that there is no meaningful legislative history of the "properly joined and 
served" language, even if we were inclined to consider such history. Further, 
Congress did not revise that language when it amended Section 1441(b)(2) in 
2011 even after some snap removals had occurred. 
 
In statutory interpretation, an absurdity is not mere oddity. The absurdity bar is 
high, as it should be. The result must be preposterous, one that "no reasonable 
person could intend." ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING 
LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 237 (2012).  In our view 
of reasonableness, snap removal is at least rational. Even if we believed that there 
was a "drafter's failure to appreciate the effect of certain provisions," such a flaw 
                                                      
124 The panel also took the view, as have most courts, that “the forum-defendant rule is a procedural rule and not a 
jurisdictional one” (citing In re 1994 Exxon Chem. Fire, 558 F.3d 378, 392-93 (5th Cir. 2009)).  See TAN ??  infra 
(discussing treatment of forum defendant rule as jurisdictional requirement akin to complete diversity as solution to 
snap removal problem). 
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by itself does not constitute an absurdity. SCALIA & GARNER, supra, at 238. 
We are not the final editors of statutes, modifying language when we perceive 
some oversight. The Second and Third Circuits rejected the same absurdity 
argument in upholding snap removal. The Second Circuit believed there was more 
than one sensible reason for the language "properly joined and served": 
 
Congress may well have adopted the "properly joined and served" 
requirement in an attempt to both limit gamesmanship and provide a 
bright-line rule keyed on service, which is clearly more easily 
administered than a fact-specific inquiry into a plaintiff's intent or 
opportunity to actually serve a home-state defendant. 
 
Gibbons, 919 F.3d at 706. In other words, a reasonable person could intend the 
results of the plain language. The Third Circuit also found that the result was not 
absurd because the interpretation gives meaning to each word and abides by the 
plain language. Encompass, 902 F.3d at 153. Of some importance, the removing 
party is not a forum defendant. Diversity jurisdiction and removal exist to protect 
out-of-state defendants from in-state prejudices.  The plain-language reading of 
the forum-defendant rule as applied in this case does not justify a court's attempt 
to revise the statute.125 
      
III. The Indefensibility of Snap Removal 
 
 Although snap removal has its judicial126 and academic127 defenders, we join those 
critical of the practice.128 Longstanding norms in American law have posited that (a) federal 
jurisdiction is limited and should be strictly construed; (b) diversity jurisdiction creates tension 
for the nation’s federalist ideals and should be particularly narrowly construed as reflected in the 
complete diversity requirement; (c) removal poses an even greater threat to federalism because it 
divests a state court of jurisdiction, and therefore requires an even narrower construction 
accompanied by strict and particular technical requirements if removal is to be effected; (d) the 
                                                      
125 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 10849 at *7-*9, 955 F.3d at ___ (citations other than to Gibbons and Stone Mansion 
removed; Capitalization in original). 
126 See TAN 88-101, supra (discussing trial court decisions permitting snap removal) and 102-125, supra 
(discussing Second, Third and Fifth Circuit decisions permitting snap removal). 
127 See, e.g., Zach Hughes, A New Argument Supporting Removal of Diversity Cases Prior to Service, 79 
DEF. COUNS. J. 205 (2012); Saurabh Bishnubhakat, Pre-Service Removal in the Forum Defendant’s 
Arsenal, 47 GONZ. L. REV. 147 (2011-2012). 
128 See, e.g., Fiskus v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 141019, 2019 WL 4953610 
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 1, 2014); Sullivan v. Novartis Pharms. Corp., 575 F. Supp. 2d 640, 645 (D. N.J. 2008); 
Nannery, supra note 7; Jordan Bailey, Comment:  Giving State Courts the Ol’ Slip: Should a Defendant be 
Allowed to Remove an Otherwise Irremovable Case to Federal Court Solely Because Removal was Made 
Before Any Defendant is Served?, 42 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 181 (2009).  Although not as appalled as we and 
some others are by snap removal, Arthur Hellman, et al., Neutralizing the Strategem of “Snap Removal”: A 
Proposed Amendment to the Judicial Code, 9 FED. CTS. L. REV. 103 (2016) is sufficiently concerned about 
snap removal as to propose a statutory amendment negating snap removal if a forum state defendant is 
served within 30 days of the removal.  See also Debra Lyn Bassett, The Forum Game, 84 N.C. L. REV. 333 
(2006). 
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presence of even a single forum state defendant sufficiently negates the local prejudice rationale 
for diversity jurisdiction to prevent removal; (e) procedure should be a “handmaiden of justice” 
advancing substantive law and policy objectives rather than undermining them through 
gamesmanship; and (f) litigation outcomes should not vary according to the respective wealth, 
resources, or status of the parties.  Absent undue plaintiff sloth in effecting service or a showing 
that a non-culpable or immune defendant has been named solely for defeating federal 
jurisdiction, removal should not be permitted in cases involving a forum state defendant simply 
because a removal petition preceded service on that defendant.   
 
A. Slouching Toward Absurdity: Excessive Textualist Literalism and the 
Advantages of Interpretative Pluralism and Purposivism 
 
 To be sure, the literal language of 28 U.S.C. 1441(b)(2) supports snap removal by 
restricting removal only “if none of the defendants properly joined and served” is a forum 
defendant. We argue, as others have, that the language produces an “absurd” result. But 
decisions allowing snap removal are all the more galling when issued under the valence of 
textualism’s virtue, which is deference to Congress. To be clear, courts permitting snap removal 
have actually (if not also deliberately) undermined Congressional understanding of a well-
established structure of relations between federal and state courts.  
 
In construing and applying a rule or statute, courts should attempt to implement the intent 
of the rulemakers or legislators and the purpose of the positive law in question.  Unfortunately, 
the good common sense of that venerable approach sometimes gives way to an overly blinkered, 
formalist textualism that emphasizes particular verbiage at the expense of the objectives of 
lawmakers.   Even strongly textualist courts implicitly concede that a literal application of the 
language of statute, rule, or contract can sometimes lead to error in that all have an “absurd 
result” exception to applying “plain language.” 
 
 Absurdity, of course, is in the eye of the beholder.  Case reports and law review articles 
reflect profound differences of opinion on the topic.  Conceptually, some regard an “absurd” 
result only as something horrific or utterly devoid of rational basis while others find something 
absurd when it is sufficiently unwise, strained, or inconsistent with the overall objective of a 
statute, rule, contract, custom or practice. 
 
 We have a moderate working definition of absurdity.  An interpretation or application of 
law brings an “absurd” result when it is blatantly inconsistent with the overall objective of the 
law.  Unlike the courts that have rejected “absurd result” analysis in permitting snap removal, we 
do not think the outcome of literal application of text needs to be ludicrously dysfunctional in 
order to qualify as sufficiently absurd to permit consideration of drafting history, drafter intent, 
statutory purpose, and the structure and function of the law in question.   
 
Indeed, we believe all these factors should routinely be considered by courts as they read 
the language of a statute or rule rather than reading the text in isolation and then considering 
these other powerful indicia of meaning only when the text is regarded as either facially 
ambiguous or producing a result so ridiculous that it can be regarded as absurd without any 
consideration of context.     
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Courts permitting snap removal, including the three circuit courts to approve the practice, 
have argued with some sophistication that snap removal is not flat-out absurd because it can be 
defended as a clear but perhaps crude means of enforcing a policy against improper joinder 
motivated only by attempts to sue in state court.   
 
Although this argument is more defensible than snap removal itself, it in our view sets the 
absurdity bar too high as means of construing problematic statutory language. One can articulate 
reasons literal enforcement of the service requirement is helpful in discouraging gamesmanship 
by plaintiffs – but this does not negate that literal enforcement of the service requirement in turn 
encourages gamesmanship by defendants as well as creating a large exception to the forum 
defendant rule even though there is not a shred of evidence that Congress has ever sought to alter 
that long-standing feature of American litigation. If the “one” who is articulating the reasons to 
justify the literal reading of a statute is not Congress nor even someone Congress-adjacent, then 
there is reason at least for pause. Indeed, if one finds oneself doing a somersault, one should ask 
for whom they are performing. 
 
Although we remain functionalist and contextualist rather than textualist, a page of 
textualism supports our position.  Textualists, in their quest for determining the “plain meaning” 
of statutory language, frequently rely on dictionaries.  A popular definition of “absurd” is 
“ridiculously unreasonable, unsound, or incongruous.”129  Synonyms for “absurd” include: 
“foolish,” “silly,” and “no showing of good sense.”130  Further, the term absurd is used “when 
something is not in keeping with common sense, good reasoning, or accepted ideas,” with the 
term foolish used “when something is not thought of by others as wise or sensible.”131   
 
Use of the word absurd “stresses a lack of logical sense or harmonious agreement, of 
parts (such as a premise and a conclusion) not fitting together.”132  Thus, by one definitional 
concept of absurdity, a construction of statutory language that is inconsistent with the intent of 
the legislature, the purpose of the statute, or the overall structure of the area of law in question 
                                                      
129 MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/absurd#synonyms (visited Sept. 
2, 2019). 
130 Id.  
131 Id. 
132 Id.  Other sources provide definitions of “absurd” that are more extreme and thus supportive of those arguing that 
snap removal, though admittedly odd and at odds with the history of federal jurisdiction, is not flat-out absurd.  See, 
e.g., VOCABULARY.COM (“[s]omething absurd is really silly, absolutely ridiculous, or total nonsense.  Thinking you 
can wear flip flops and a bikini to the North Pole is an absurd idea.)”; DICTIONARY.COM (something is absurd if it is 
“utterly or obviously senseless, illogical, or untrue; contrary to all reason or common sense; laughably foolish or 
false”).   
 While these more extreme concepts of what it means to absurd provide to very limited use of the absurd 
result exception to plain language statutory construction, they also illustrate a major problem with textualism (or at 
least the type of acontextual textualism that requires an absurd result as a pre-condition to departing from literalism).  
There are many dictionaries and usually multiple accepted definitions of a term, synonyms for a term, and 
connotative values of a term.  In addition, dictionaries change over time but textualists appear not to have coalesced 
around norm for use of different dictionary editions and time period.  One can make a strong case that the relevant 
dictionaries regarding the meaning of a word in a statute are only those dictionaries contemporaneous with the 
legislation.  Does this also mean that the definition of what is an “absurd” result should also be based on the 
understanding of the time when a statue was enacted or amended?  
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could be deemed “absurd.”  Using this or related concepts of absurdity, a sizeable number of trial 
courts have found snap removal to be absurd.133 
 
But, at the risk of a bad anti-textualist pun, where is it “written” that statutory language 
must be applied literally unless the result is absurd?  Why is it not sufficient that literal 
application of the text be at odds with factors such as legislative intent, statutory purpose, 
statutory function, role of the statute in the legal fabric, or other structural aspects of the legal 
system?  Our view is that something considerably less than absurdity should counsel against a 
literalist application of problematic statutory language. 
 
Textualist courts, however, set their rhetorical table by citing precedent stating that the 
“plain” or “clear” language of a statute controls unless the result is absurd, citing cases stressing 
statutory text or declaring that if text is facially clear, no further inquiry or resort to extrinsic 
sources is permitted.134 A milder form of this textualist approach posits that “[w]here the text of 
a statute is unambiguous, the statute should be enforced as written and only the most 
extraordinary showing of contrary intentions in the legislative history will justify a departure 
from that language.”135   
 
This approach makes it hard – too hard in our view – to displace even unintended or 
unwise application of statutory language.  First, it begs the question of when documentary text is 
“unambiguous.”  While courts taking this view undoubtedly mean the text is plain on its two-
dimensional, paper and ink face, this very determination requires some imbedded assumptions 
about the nature of the statute and the usage of words.  “Chair” means one thing when furniture 
shopping, another when holding a meeting, another when making academic appointments, and 
another when discussing capital punishment.   
 
Textualist judges seldom make explicit the context and perspective from which they are 
determining whether a word is clear or unclear.  Sometimes the context is obvious from the 
situation but not always.  The judge’s conscious or unconscious associations with a word, 
enterprise, or government activity are almost never apparent to the outside world.  This makes a 
case for less judicial jumping to conclusions about linguistic meaning and more express 
examination of factors other than text that inform the meaning of the text.  
 
Second, it is not clear what constitutes an “extraordinary” showing of contrary legislative 
intent.   Is context enough?  Individual legislator floor statements?  Committee reports?  Hearing 
testimony? Contemporaneous news accounts of the problem to be “solved” by the legislation in 
question? 
 
Third, the focus on legislative history alone needlessly limits the amount of information 
that courts may use in statutory construction.  The background of the legislation might shed more 
                                                      
133 See, e.g., Fiskus v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 141019, 2019 WL 4953610 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 
1, 2014); Sullivan v. Novartis Pharms. Corp., 575 F. Supp. 2d 640, 645 (D. N.J. 2008). 
134 See, e.g., Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Poling, 81 N.W.2d 462, 466 (Iowa 1957)(“resort may be had to rules of 
construction only where the language of an instrument is of doubtful meaning”); Mautner v. Peralta, 263 Cal. Rptr. 
535, 541 (Ct. App. 1989)(“ambiguity ordinarily is a condition precedent to statutory interpretation.”). 
135 McMaster v. E. Armored Servs., Inc., 780 F.3d 167, 170 (3d Cir. 2015)(citations omitted), cited in Stone 
Mansion, supra, __ F.3d at __, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 23576 at *9-*10. 
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light on the goals of the act than more official legislative history.  But “moderate” textualists 
willing to allow powerful legislative history to impact construction of statutory verbiage want to 
limit the inquiry to only formal legislative history, which seems to us unduly narrow. 
 
Fourth, this approach also begs the question – examined more fully below – as to why 
text is given such disproportionate weight relative to legislative intent and statutory purpose.  
Strong textualism has been enjoying a roughly 40-year reign that roughly coincides with Antonin 
Scalia’s ascension to the Supreme Court.136  But this is a relatively recent development.  For 
many decades, legislative intent was the touchstone of statutory construction.137  And in 
centuries past, purposivism held sway, with a leading precedent instructing courts to “suppress 
the mischief and advance the remedy” in construing statutes.138 Using this venerable approach 
would almost certainly lead the majority of courts to disapprove snap removal.   
 
While there is no shortage of cases making textualist pronouncements, this approach 
ignores the many cases139 – and extensive scholarly commentary140 – that stress the importance 
of legislative intent, statutory purpose, system functionality, and public policy.   
                                                      
136 No doubt owing not only to his prominence and power as a U.S. Supreme Court Justice but his extensive 
intellectual entrepreneurship.  See, e.g.  ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A GARNER, READING LAW: THE 
INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS (2012)(promoting textualism and use of canons of construction, both textual and 
substantive, as preferred to examination of legislative history); Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 
56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1176 (1989)(promoting formalist methodology as well as textualism). 
137 See William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA. L. REV. 621, 621 (1990)(describing U.S. Supreme 
Court’s “traditional approach” prior to the Scalia Era as willingness “to consider virtually any contextual evidence, 
especially the statute’s legislative history, even though the statutory text has an apparent ‘plain meaning.’”); A. 
Michael Froomkin, Book Review, Climbing the Most Dangerous Branch: Legisprudence and the New Legal 
Process, 66 TEX. L. REV. 1071 (1988)(reviewing First Edition of WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & PHILLIP P. FRICKEY, 
LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY (1988)(noting variant approaches to statutory 
interpretation); William S. Blatt, The History of Statutory Interpretation: A Study in Form and Substance, 6 
CARDOZO L. REV. 799, 801-02 (1985)(finding that prevailing views regarding proper approach to statutory 
interpretation vary by era and that, for example, 19th Century emphasized legislative intent while first half of 20th 
Century gave greater emphasis to statutory purpose of the “equity of the statute”).  See also Larry W. Yackle, A 
Worthy Champion for Fourteenth Amendment Rights: The United States in Parens Patriae, 92 NW. U.L. REV. 111, 
(1997)(describing modern Supreme Court interpretation only a few years after Eskridge’s New Textualism article as 
reflecting “fetish for textualism”). 
138 Heydon’s Case, 76 Eng. Reports 637 (1584)(describing judiciary’s task of statutory interpretation as to “suppress 
the mischief” that prompted the statute and “advance the remedy” sought by the legislature). 
139 See, e.g., Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 383 (1991)(focusing on central purpose of statute as much or more 
than text, an approach described as backwards by Justice Scalia IN ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN GARNER, READING 
LAW 16-17 (2012); Public Citizen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 454 (1989)(reflecting concern over 
legislative intent and purpose); Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457 (1892)(stressing that “spirit” or 
purpose of the statute may be at odds with literal language and deciding case based on purpose).  Holy Trinity 
Church has in some quarters acquired a bad name because of its nativist “Christian Nation” rhetoric used in the 
course of ruling that a New York City Episcopal church’s importation of an English minister did not violate labor 
and immigration laws.  But the opinion’s commitment to purposivism strikes us as perfectly politically correct.  See 
generally Carol Chomsky, Unlocking the Mysteries of Holy Trinity Church: Spirit, Letter, and History in Statutory 
Interpretation, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 901 (2000)(extensive examination of decision and its background generally 
approving of its methodology despite arguable reflected animus toward laborers lacking Anglican pedigree). 
140 See, e.g., WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., INTERPRETING LAW: A PRIMER ON HOW TO READ STATUTES AND THE 
CONSTITUTION (2016); WILLIAM D. POPKIN, THE JUDICIAL ROLE: STATUTORY INTERPRETATION AND THE 
PRAGMATIC JUDICIAL PARTNER (2013); WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., INTERPRETING LAW: A PRIMER ON HOW TO 
READ STATUTES AND THE CONSTITUTION (2016); WILLIAM D. POPKIN, THE JUDICIAL ROLE: STATUTORY 
INTERPRETATION AND THE PRAGMATIC JUDICIAL PARTNER (2013); WILLIAM D. POPKIN, STATUTES IN COURT: THE 
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Courts favoring snap removal have to some degree “cherry-picked” precedents in order to 
embrace rather muscular textualism when they would be equally free to focus on less textualist 
precedents.  Although there may be some situations when adherence to a particularly textualist 
literalism is compelled by precedent, we think these comparatively rare.   
 
For example, U.S. Supreme Court decisions of course stress the importance of statutory 
language – but they also stress the importance of other interpretative factors.141  The modern 
Court’s interpretative continuum ranges from the late Justice Scalia (who at times deemed all 
legislative history irrelevant)142 to Justice Breyer (who views legislative history as important and 
highly indicative/determinative of statutory meaning).143 
 
A full critique of textualism, of which there are many,144 is beyond the scope of this 
article.  The problem of snap removal is to a large degree a jurisprudential problem concerning 
the apt approach to statutory language.  Courts permitting snap removal take a highly textualist 
approach and are unmoved by results that are “merely” inconsistent with legislative intent, 
history, statutory purpose, or the larger policy objectives of the law.145   
 
Courts remanding snap removal cases take a more contextual and functional approach, 
assessing multiple interpretative factors and concluding that it is unlikely that Congress, when 
adding the service language to the removal statute in 1948 intended to abolish the forum 
defendant rule in cases where defendants were clever enough and well-staffed enough to win 
races to the courthouse.146 
 
 Courts that follow the textualist route to snap removal pay a high price for the mechanical 
simplicity of that approach. The casualties—seldom if ever recognized—are the history of 
diversity jurisdiction and removal, the purpose of diversity jurisdiction and removal, the 
longstanding adherence to the forum defendant rule, and the public policy consensus that the 
removal route to federal court should be strictly construed and generally not open in cases where 
one of the defendants is a forum state citizen. 
                                                                                                                                                                              
HISTORY AND THEORY OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION (1999);WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, DYNAMIC STATUTORY 
INTERPRETATION (1994); GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982);  William D. 
Popkin, An “Internal” Critique of Justice Scalia’s Theory of Statutory Interpretation, 76 MINN. L. REV. 1133, 1142 
(1992); William N. Eskridge & Philip Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 
321 (1990). 
141 See, e.g., WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, ET AL. CASES AND MATERIAL ON LEGISLATION AND REGULATION: STATUTES 
AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY Ch. 5 (6th ed. 2020)(reviewing historical and current theories of statutory 
interpretation, citing cases and secondary authority).. 
142 See, e.g., SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 136; ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION (1997); Scalia, 
The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, supra note 136. 
143 See, e.g., Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 845 
(1992).  See also Kenneth R. Dortzbach, Legislative History: The Philosophies of Justices Scalia and Breyer and the 
Use of Legislative History by the Wisconsin Supreme Courts, 80 MARQUETTE L. REV. 161 (1995) 
144 See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Should the Supreme Court Read the Federalist But Not Statutory Legislative 
History?, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1301 (1998); Eskridge, The New Textualism, supra note 137. 
145 See, e.g., Regal Stone Ltd. v. Longs Drug Stores Cal., L.L.C., 881 F. Supp. 2d 1123, 1127-29 (N.D. Cal. 2012); 
North v. Precision Airmotive Corp., 600 F. Supp. 2d 1263, 1268 (M.D. Fla. 2009). 
146 See, e.g., Little v. Wyndham Worldwide Operations, Inc., 251 F. Supp. 3d 1215, 1218-23 (M.D. Tenn. 2017); 
Vivas v. Boeing Co., 486 F. Supp. 2d 726, 734 (N.D. Ill. 2007). 
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In denying remand in Flash Boys style snap removal cases, courts unnecessarily privilege 
textualism and formalism (arriving at the courthouse prior to removal) over fairness and regard 
for substantive policy (the forum defendant rule) in favor of form.   Worse yet, some courts, 
including one of the three circuit court panels addressing snap removal, has denied remand even 
where adversarial cleverness spilled over into outright deception.147 
 
 At a minimum, opinions permitting snap removal suffer from an overarching failure to 
think about the purpose of not only isolated language but an entire statutory scheme and the 
judicial system as well as the public policy and history underlying the forum defendant rule and 
the structure of federal jurisdiction. 
 
 The basic interpretative error in cases permitting snap removal cases is a brittle and 
formal brand of textualism that masquerades as neutral and simple.  Courts permitting snap 
removal are doing something considerably more than simply giving words their seeming natural 
meaning.  They are reading the language not just literally but out of context and without regard 
for other legitimate interpretative factors. 
 
 The root of this interpretative error is a radical form of textualism that regards only the 
text of a statute as “law.”  The philosophical and jurisprudential underpinnings of this view have 
never been particularly clearly articulated, much less (in our view) persuasively articulated.  The 
argument, so far as we can discern, is that only the statutory text is actually enacted by Congress 
in a bill signed by the President.  Consequently, surrounding information – the context of the 
legislation – is not “the law” and should not be considered.   
 
The proposition is incorrect.  Language has meaning only in context – not only the 
context of surrounding language in the same document but also the context giving rise to a 
document or law:  the status quo; the perceived problems or opportunities that prompted 
legislation; the facts known to the drafters; the goals of the drafters and the purpose of the 
legislation; their understanding of the likely application of the language and the place of the 
legislation in the overall fabric of the law.   
 
Staring incessantly at a few words of the statute (e.g., “and served”) without using this 
other information to determine the proper application of the particular words and the statute as a 
whole strikes us as folly.  And from this folly flows the error of allowing wording that was 
unproblematic in 1948 to morph into a purported plain meaning edict allowing litigation 
maneuvering completely at odds with the statute in question as well as the larger federal court 
system.148 
                                                      
147 See TAN     , supra (discussing Third Circuit’s Stone Mansion decision). 
148 Snap removal, despite its tension with or destruction of the forum defendant rule, could be defended as 
sufficiently beneficial because of efficiency concerns.  Snap removal – which can be done in ultimate 
Flash Boys style by large pharmaceutical or chemical companies subject to frequent and related litigation 
– may foster consolidation.  Once in federal court, such litigation is more easily subject to MDL (multi-district 
litigation; see 28 U.S.C. §1407) or related consolidation that is more difficult where similar cases are strewn through 
50 state court systems as well as 94 federal district courts.   
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If important extra-textual public policies are considered, the costs of the narrow 
textualism permitting snap removal becomes apparent.  When snap removal is permitted, the 
history, rationale, structure and function of federalism, diversity jurisdiction and removal is 
given short shrift.  While one can reasonably question the rationale of the forum defendant rule 
(i.e., that a single in-state defendant removes risk of local bias or prejudice), it has, whatever 
shortcomings of its rationale, long been the accepted rule.  Circumvention of the rule cannot be 
justified by the weak reed of the words “and served” added to §1441(b)(2) seventy years ago 
when no one but perhaps science fiction authors could have imagined current technology. 
 
In addition, permitting snap removal undermines public policy favoring 
federalism and plaintiff forum choice is severely undermined and inequality of resources 
is exacerbated.  Comparatively wealthy defendants are provided another procedural 
weapon while comparatively impoverished plaintiffs are partially disarmed.  The 
consequences of this implicit favoritism toward defendants is exacerbated by the current 
composition of the federal bench, which has become significantly more pro-defendant 
than most of its state court counterparts. 
 
Further, there appears to be no social gain from snap removal – unless one believes 
that state courts are overly generous to plaintiffs or unfair to defendants.  That’s possible 
of course.  But available evidence regarding win/loss rates and damage awards suggests 
that state-federal divergence is not one of excessive state court largess but rather 
considerably more pro-defendant federal court outcomes that have created a conventional 
wisdom in the defense bar counseling escape from state courts whenever possible.149  
Snap removal thus adds more time and expense to litigation (with the convenient effect 
for defendants in that it imposes burdens on plaintiff counsel who is probably not getting 
hourly compensation in return) without discernible social benefit.150  
 
In addition, snap removal based on textual literalism cannot be justified on the  
assumption that Congress will take corrective action if it disagrees.  A crowded 
legislative agenda, partisan infighting, interest group influence, and an array of diversions 
of the calendar (e.g., elections, pandemics, impeachment) all combine to produce 
legislative gridlock and reduce the realistic chance of swift congressional correction of 
                                                                                                                                                                              
 Or at least this is one possible defense of snap removal, albeit one that we have not seen in the defense bar 
literature, which seems to regard it as a given that federal courts are more favorable to defendants and should be 
reached whenever possible by whatever means necessary.  
 This justification, though not absurd, is not in our view persuasive.  More important, it appears not to 
account for much snap removal practice by defendants.  See Thomas O. Main, et al., The Elastics of Snap Removal: 
Empirically Assessing a Troublesome Judicial Divide (October 2019)(unpublished manuscript on file with 
authors)(finding comparatively few instances of snap removal in cases subject to MDL proceedings).  To be sure, 
drugmakers, manufacturers, and insurers have pursued snap removal.  But it appears they have done so primarily in 
individual cases and have made no overt effort to promote snap removal as a means of placing more cases in federal 
court in order to foster consolidation, streamlined pretrial procedure, effective case management, or global 
settlement. 
149 See Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Do Case Outcomes Really Reveal Anything About The Legal 
System?  Win Rates and Removal Jurisdiction, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 581, 593 (1998)(noting overall plaintiff win rate 
of 58 percent for cases initially filed in federal court compared to win rate of only 37 percent for removed cases). 
150 See Nannery, supra note 7, at 568-70.  
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decisions regarded as erroneous, particularly if the issue is not salient to layperson voters.  
Regarding snap removal, the most influential observers (plaintiff counsel. defense 
counsel, and commercial clients) are divided, making swift legislative correction 
unlikely. 
 
B. Legislative History Augurs Against Snap Removal 
 
 Although there is not much documentation of congressional intent underlying the 1948 
language change that introduced the service requirement to the forum defendant rule, there is 
certainly nothing to suggest that Congress intended to eliminate or significantly curtail the rule.   
 
On the contrary, available evidence suggests that Congress was perfectly happy with the 
forum defendant rule.  Congress did not wish in 1948 to change the rule but rather only to 
prevent it from being misused by plaintiffs naming sham forum state defendants in their 
complaints as a means of defeating removal.   
 
Under these circumstances, it seems inappropriate to interpret the language added in 1948 
as an expansion of removal.  For similar reasons, it seems inappropriate to construe lack of 
revision of the removal statute by Congress – in the 2011 amendments or in any congressional 
session – as congressional endorsement of snap removal or even acquiescence to it. 
 
One school of statutory interpretation commonly associated with the late Justice John 
Paul Stevens treats congressional silence or inaction as an indication that congress intends no 
significant change in the law.151  If it had, it would have made more noise.  Sometimes, perhaps 
even often, it is significant that the “dog didn’t bark”: a reference to a Sherlock Holmes story in 
which a prize horse is stolen without the family dog barking at the thief.  Holmes correctly 
deduces that the dog failed to bark because the thief was someone known to the animal.152 
 
                                                      
151 See, e.g., Martinez v. Court of Appeal, 528 U.S. 152, 159 (2000)(“negative historical evidence” or absence of 
evidence of intent to effect significant change, is relevant to issues of legislative intent in manner similar to 
relevance of dog failing to bark during theft); Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, 458 U.S. 564, 577 (1982)(Stevens, J. 
dissenting)(joined by Blackman, J.)(“unremarkable” type of revision to statute without commentary in legislative 
history suggests absence of congressional intent to effect significant change in the law; “the fact that the dog did not 
bark can itself be significant”)(citing Harrison v. PPG Industries, Inc., 446 U.S. 578, 602)(1980)(opinion of Justice 
Rehnquist using this analogy but declining to follow it in that case).  But see Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 404, 
406(1991)(Scalia, J., dissenting)(joined by Rehnquist, C.J. and Kennedy, J.)(assuming that dogs will bark when 
something important is happening is “questionable wisdom” and arguing that the Court has “forcefully and 
explicitly rejected the Conan Doyle approach to statutory construction in the past.”).   
Perhaps Justice Scalia is right about the Court’s overall attitude toward this tool for assessing legislative 
activity.  There are only a few Supreme Court cases expressly referring to the barking dog metaphor and this article 
is not an attempt to ascertain the precise views of individual justices on the question.  But we are sure that Justice 
Scalia is wrong and that Justice Stevens is correct in positing that when legislatures are making significant changes 
in the law by altering language, there is normally a rather well-developed historical trail in addition to the language 
change itself.  Justice Scalia’s error, in substantial part, stems from his ultra-textualist views that lead him to be 
relatively uninterested in congressional intent and purpose and in the legislative process itself since the late Justice 
thought these irrelevant or even illegitimate as interpretative tools. 
152 See A. Conan Doyle, Silver Blaze in THE COMPLETE SHERLOCK HOLMES 383 (1938)(cited by Justice Stevens in 
Martinez v. Court of Appeal, 528 U.S. 152, 159 (2000) and in Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, 458 U.S. 564, 577 
(1982)(Stevens, J. dissenting)). 
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This common sense maxim augurs in favor of limiting the “joined and served” language 
of §1441(b)(2) to situations where a forum defendant is named but not seriously pursued by 
plaintiff or clearly cannot be liable as a matter of law.  So long as defendant’s joinder is not 
clearly futile or a sham, the “and served” language should not be a tail that wags the larger dog 
of the forum defendant limitation on removal.   
 
If Congress had wanted the “and served” language to have such a large impact on 
removal practice by creating an entirely new genre of snap removal, it likely would have made 
this clear somewhere in hearing testimony, a committee report, a floor statement, or 
contemporaneous accounts of the legislation. Congresspersons regularly promote their activities 
to the press and reporters regularly seek information about the intent, purpose, goals, and 
planned impact of legislation.  If there was any congressional desire to have 1948’s new service 
provisions overturn the basic forum defendant rule, one would expect to find at least some 
“barking” to that effect.  But there appears to be no – not a shred – of such evidence supporting 
snap removal. 
 
For that reason, courts err if they treat the 1948 addition of the service language too 
literally and in derogation of the basic forum defendant limitation on removal.  Congress’s 
failure to correct the error in the 2011 amendments to the removal statute arguably presents a 
closer question but on balance it appears the 2011 revision has no bearing on the snap removal 
issue.  As one commentator concluded: 
 
The “properly joined and served” language remains in [§]1441(b)(2) even after 
the statute was amended in 2011.  The removal statute now states that a diversity 
case “may not be removed if any of the parties in interest properly joined and 
served as defendants is a citizen of the State in which such action is brought.  The 
amended statute simply restates the forum defendant rule in positive rather than 
negative terms.  There is no evidence in the legislative history of the 2011 
amendment that Congress was concerned with the interpretation of the word 
“none,” or that Congress intended to preserve or override any practice under or 
interpretation of the forum defendant rule by leaving the remainder of the 
provision intact.153 
   
But by 2011, there was a substantial group of snap removal decisions, many of them 
giving literal reading to the “and served” language and permitting snap removal.  One could 
argue that Congress was presumptively aware of those decisions and that Congress would amend 
§1441(b)(2) to legislatively overrule them if it disagreed.  But Congress did not change the 
service language even though it was already addressing removal.  Proponents of snap removal 
construe this as tacit approval of a literalist construction of §1441(b)(2) and of snap removal.154   
 
This interpretation of the 2011 Amendment is at least problematic and probably 
erroneous for a several reasons.  First, Congress may not have been aware of snap removal and 
almost certainly was not keenly aware of snap removal.  Although scholarly analysis suggests 
                                                      
153 See Nannery, supra note 7, at 549 (citations omitted).  See also H.R. Rep. No. 112-10 at 12 (stating that revision 
to §1441(b) merely “restates the substance of the . . . current subsection.”). 
154 See TAN 102-125, supra (discussing Stone Mansion, Gibbons , and Texas Brine decisions). 
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that Congress is surprisingly well informed about judicial decisions155 (and thus presumably 
capable of responding to them), these studies concentrate on Supreme Court and circuit court 
decisions that are logically more visible to congressional staff.   
 
Trial court decisions that tend to evade appellate review, as is the case with most removal 
and remand matters, were less likely to register with Congress during the roughly five years that 
snap removal opinions were being rendered in significant number prior to the 2011 
Amendments.  Congress may not in fact have known about snap removal at all.  It was only in 
2019, after two circuit court decisions approving the practice that the House of Representatives 
held hearings on the matter.156   There is nothing in the 2011 legislative history to suggest that it  
it consciously decided to retain the “joined and served” statutory language because it approved or 
or even tolerated snap removal.   
 
Second, congressional awareness does not equal congressional ability to address a 
problem at the juncture in question.  The press of other business and a looming election year 
might well have prompted the 2011 Congress to maintain the service language status quo even if 
it has misgivings about application of the language in snap removal cases. 
 
Third, Congress may have in fact been aware of decisions permitting snap removal.  If so, 
it was also undoubtedly aware of decisions remanding such cases and making a less textualist 
construction of §1441(b)(2)’s service language.  As of the time of the 2011 Amendment to the 
removal statute, there was relatively even division of the trial court cases as of 2011, and the 
absence of appellate precedent.   
 
Under these circumstances, Congress may have preferred to leave the service language 
unchanged to give the judicial process time to resolve the issue.  This is an especially likely 
scenario even if Congress in 2011 was aware of the issue and concerned about snap removal but 
not particularly sure of how to constrain it.  Or the 2011 Congress may have been relatively 
confident that judicial doctrine would eventually prohibit snap removal.  Although cases like 
                                                      
155 See, e.g., Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Bressman, Statutory Interpretation From the Inside – An Emprical Study of 
Congressional Drafting, Delegation and the Canons: Part I, 65 STAN. L. REV. 901 (2013); Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa 
Bressman, Statutory Interpretation From the Inside – An Empriical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation 
and the Canons: Part II, 66 STAN. L. REV. 725 (2014); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Matthew R. Christiansen, 
Congressional Overrides of Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 1967-2011, 92 TEX. L. REV. 1317 
(2014); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 101 YALE L.J. 331 
(1991)(examination of congressional override legislation during 1967-1990 time period suggests fairly close 
monitoring of Supreme Court opinions by congressional staff and particularly interested members). 
156 See Committee on the Judiciary of the U.S. House of Representatives, Subcommittee on Courts, Intellectual 
Property, and the Internet, Examining the Use of “Snap” Removals to Circumvent the Forum Defendant Rule (Nov. 
14, 2019); Hon. Jerrold Nadler, Chairman Nadler Statement for Subcommittee Hearing on “Examining the Use of 
‘Snap’ Removals to Circumvent the Forum Defendant Rule (Press Release Nov. 14, 2019)(“Unfortunately, a 
combination of modern technology, a desire by some corporations to avoid state courts seemingly at any cost, and a 
supposed loophole in the removal statute has engendered a new tactic [by defendants].  [T]his sort of gamesmanship 
is clearly contrary to the spirit and the intent of the federal removal statute . . . .  This evasion of the well-established 
forum defendant rule also threatens state sovereignty and violates federalism principles by denying state courts the 
ability to shape state law.  State courts should be the final arbiters of state law, but snap removals are increasingly 
putting new state-law questions into federal court. . . . This issue may seem obscure, but it is a growing problem . . . 
”)(emphasis added). 
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Stone Mansion, Gibbons, and Texas Brine show any such confidence was misplaced, a rational 
Congress might very well have expected a common law evolution against snap removal.   
 
Fourth, there are serious questions about the legitimacy of using the inaction of a 
subsequent Congress to shape judicial interpretation of a law enacted decades before the inactive 
Congress just as there would be serious concern if a court relied on a 2011 congressional floor 
statement as if it were contemporaneous legislative history for a 1948 statute.  If a subsequent 
Congress is to “speak” with authority the meaning of a statute, it must actually amend the statute.  
Although there are circumstances where “subsequent legislative history” may be relevant, the 
2011 amendments to removal law appear not to be such an instance. 
 
Relatedly, changes in circumstances and changes in the political, socioeconomic, and 
ideological composition of Congress may make it particularly dangerous to use the inaction or 
statements of a later Congress as guides to understanding the intent and purpose of a much 
earlier legislating Congress.  The composition of Congress may well have changed dramatically.  
A later Congress of course has the right to change the legislation of an earlier Congress with 
which it has come to disagree.  But the later Congress has no authority to change the work of a 
prior Congress merely through inaction or criticism of that prior work. 
 
The 1948 Congress that amended the removal statute included a House of 
Representatives with 246 Republicans and 188 Democrats (as well as one Labor Party member) 
with a Senate of 51 Republicans and 45 Democrats.157  The 2011 Congress had 242 Republicans 
and 193 Democrats in the House, with  47 Republicans and 51 Democrats in the Senate.158  
Although this is relatively consistent partisan alignment of the respective chambers, it of course 
fails to account for changes in party ideology and composition as well as the ideological, public 
policy and jurisprudential orientation of members as well as the relative presence or absence of 
attorneys in Congress.   
 
Although a painstaking examination of the educational background of the legislators is 
beyond the scope of this article, our exploratory examination suggests that the 1948 Congress 
had proportionately more attorneys (58 percent)159 than Congress in 2011 (42 percent),160 a 
comparison that reflects a long-term trend.161  It stands to reason that a more lawyer-laden 
legislative body could be seen as unlikely to undermine the long-standing forum defendant rule 
through a two-word provision aimed at sham defendants. Further, the 2011 Congress, which was 
                                                      
157 See Brookings Institution, Vital Statistics on Congress, https://www.brookings.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2019/03/1-20-Full.pdf (visited April 25, 2020); https://history.house.gov/Congressional-
Overview/Profiles/80th/; https://www.senate.gov/history/partydiv.htm. 
158 See Composite Picture of the Current Congress, 26 CONG. DIG. 183, 184 (June/July 1947). 
159 This included244 Representatives and 62 Senators who listed their occupation or training as law divided by the 
535-member Congress.  Id. 
160 A figure derived by dividing the 168 Representatives and 57 Senators who listed their occupation or training as 
law (according to Jennifer E. Manning, Congressional Research Service, Membership of the 111th Congress: A 
Profile (Nov. 26, 2012) available at chttps://fas.org/sgp/crs/mis/R41647.pdf) by the 535-member Congress. 
161 See Debra Cassens Weiss, Lawyer no longer dominate Congress; is commercialization to blame?, A.B.A.J. (Jan. 
20, 2016), http://www.abajounal.com/news/article/lawyers_no_longer_dominate_congress (visited April 25, 
2020)(In the mid-19th century, nearly 80 percent of members of Congress were lawyers . . . The percentage fell to 
less than 60 percent in the 1960s and less than 40 percent in 2015.”).  See also Nick Robinson, The Decline of the 
Lawyer Politician, 65 BUFF. L. REV. 657 (2017).  
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nearly half attorneys, was unlikely to have silently approved of dilution of the forum defendant 
rule even if its membership was not as lawyer-laden as its predecessors. 
 
Fifth, treating the 1948 removal amendments as static while attributing meaning to the 
absence of change in the 2011 amendments arguably transposes sound statutory construction 
theory.  Even a traditionalist should permit some degree of dynamic statutory interpretation in 
assessing the service language added in 1948.   
 
At the time of amendment, there were no electronic dockets (and certainly no electronic 
docket monitoring software), no internet, no personal computers, no wi-fi, no mobile phones, and 
only relatively slow electronic connections.  Even the most prescient of the enactors of the “and 
served” language could never have imagined that the language would permit super-speedy snap 
removal that was fast enough to leapfrog service of process.   
 
One might thus ask what the authors of the 1948 language would have thought, done, and 
legislated if they could see into the future.162  Most likely, a group that did not like joinder of 
sham defendants but wished to continue the venerable forum defendant rule would be appalled at 
the prospect of its evasion through new technology.  Although this approach to statutory 
construction is controversial and opposed by originalists, it is at least as logically legitimate and 
informative as treating the silence of the 2011 amendments – which said nothing about snap 
removal – as an endorsement of snap removal. 
 
C. Permitting Snap Removal Rewards Problematic Behavior by Defendants and 
Counsel 
  
          Decisions supporting snap removal also err in that they implicitly approve of what most 
people (indeed, most lawyers not on the payroll of a snap-removing defendant) would regard as 
undue trickiness.163  The ideas that a defendant can evade the long-standing forum defendant 
limitation on removal through use of faster computers and on-call lawyers should strike 
reasonable people as too clever by half.  The adversary system of American litigation envisions 
vigorous advocacy but should not enshrine sneaky tricks.  As further discussed below, U.S. 
Supreme Court precedent regarding removal made a strong statement to this effect prior to the 
advent of the snap removal era.164  
 
 The facilitation of trickery and gaming the system through a literal application of the 
service language is also ironic in light of and contradicted by the history of the service language, 
which “was intended to prevent gamesmanship by plaintiffs, who might otherwise name an in-
state defendant against whom there is no valid claim merely to prevent removal by the other 
defendants.”165 Consequently, “[a]llowing defendants to rush to remove newly filed state court 
                                                      
162 See Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation:  In the Classroom and In the Courtroom, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 
800(1983)(advocating judicial use of “imaginative reconstruction” of congressional intent and understanding of 
impact of legislation were it aware of modern developments). 
163 See MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note   , §107.55[22] at 107-108 (literal application of “and served” 
language “would enable gamesmanship by defendants, who, by monitoring the state docket and removing actions to 
federal court before the plaintiff has a chance to serve the forum defendant, could always avoid the rule.”). 
164 See Murphy Bros. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, 526 U.S. 344 (1999), discussed at TAN 167-180, infra. 
165 See MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 7, §107.55[22] at 107-108. 
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cases before the plaintiff has a chance to serve the forum defendant would turn Congressional 
intent to prevent litigant gamesmanship on its head.”166 
 
 Supreme court precedent is also a brief against attorney trickery, technicality and sharp 
practices.  In Murphy Brothers v. Michetti Pipe Stringing,167 plaintiff Michetti’s clever lawyers 
faxed a “courtesy” copy of a breach of contract complaint to a Murphy executive as a prelude to 
settlement discussion.  Negotiations proved unsuccessful and Michetti than sued.  Murphy 
removed the case to federal court 30 days later, which was 44 days after receipt of the faxed 
courtesy copy.  Michetti argued that removal was untimely pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1441(b), 
which provides that “notice of removal . . . shall be field within thirty days after the receipt by 
the defendant, thought service or otherwise, of a copy of the initial pleading.”168   
 
 The trial court denied Michetti’s remand motion, reasoning that the faxed courtesy copy 
did not start the 30-day removal clock.  The Eleventh Circuit reversed169 but the Supreme Court 
found Murphy’s removal timely, holding that informal delivery of a complaint did not qualify as 
the type of “or otherwise” delivery that would trigger the removal deadline.170 
 
D. Supreme Court Removal Precedent Casts Doubt on Snap Removal and the Textual 
Literalism that Facilitates Snap Removal 
 
 The Murphy Brothers court held that a defendant ordinarily was not obligated to take any 
action in a lawsuit that had yet to commence.171 In so ruling, the Court implicitly rejected the 
type of textualist literalism used by today’s courts permitting snap removal and took a more 
functionalist approach sensitive to the overall purpose, structure and function of the court system 
– an approach similar to that of the today’s courts rejecting snap removal. 
 
 The Murphy Brothers Court also looked closely at the 1948 Amendments to the removal 
statute that introduced the 30-day deadline172 – the same 1948 legislation that added the “and 
served” language even though one could argue that the words “by service or otherwise” had a 
plain meaning that eliminated any need to examine legislative history.  This was the 
interpretative methodology used by the Eleventh Circuit that the Court rejected.173   
 
 In words that should inform today’s courts addressing snap removal, the Court 
approvingly cited a trial court’s observation that “If in fact the words ‘service or otherwise’ had a 
plain meaning, the cases would not be so hopelessly split over their proper interpretation.”174  
                                                      
166 See MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 7, §107.55[22] at 107-108, citing cases. 
167 526 U.S. 344 (1999). 
168 See 526 U.S. at 348-49. 
169 See Michetti Pipe Stringing v. Murphy Bros., 125 F.3d 1396 (11th Cir. 1997). 
170 See 526 U.S. at 349. 
171 See 526 U.S. at 349-50.  “In the absence of service of process . . . a court ordinarily may not exercise power over 
a party the complaint names as defendant.”  526 U.S. at 349. 
172 See 526 U.S. at 351-53. 
173 See 526 U.S. at 353.  See also 526 U.S. at 344-55 (noting that courts have given “receipt through service or 
otherwise” language in Fed. R. Civ. P. 81(c) functionalist rather than literalist interpretation. 
174 526 U.S. at 353, citing Apache Nitrogen Products, Inc. v. Harbor Ins. Co., 145 F.R.D., 674, 679 (Ariz. 1993).  
See also 526 U.S. at 354 (reviewing alternative means that defendant might otherwise receive a complaint that 
would be consistent with litigation having already been commenced). 
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The Court further approved a circuit court opinion taking the position that “‘nothing . . . would 
justify our concluding that the drafters, in their quest for evenhandedness and promptness in the 
removal process, intended to abrogate the necessity for something as fundamental as service of 
process.’”175 
 
 Murphy Brothers was also functionalist and pragmatic rather than textualist in that the 
Court noted that a literalist approach to the term “or otherwise” and its attendant starting of the 
clock upon fax transmission (or today’s even faster and more extensive electronic means) could 
“operate with notable unfairness to individuals and entities in foreign nations” because of the 
longer time required for service abroad.176 
  
 While one must not make too much over a 20-year-old precedent that is not entirely on 
all fours with a snap removal case (as well as reflecting a 6-3 split in the Court),177 the parallels 
are sufficient to place the Murphy Brothers precedent on the side of those remanding snap 
removals.  This modern removal precedent takes an approach like the courts barring snap 
removal and rejects the textual literalism of the courts permitting snap removal.178  It is clear 
from the dissent, which argued for a textually literalist approach to the issue, that the Court 
majority did not merely overlook the “plain meaning” tact taken by pro-snap removal courts.  
Rather, Murphy Brothers consciously rejected this approach, jurisprudential history that has been 
unduly overlooked by the three circuit courts permitting snap removal. 
 
 At a minimum, Murphy Brothers demands at least some attention from courts addressing 
snap removal.  But astonishingly, neither the Third Circuit’s Stone Mansion decision179 nor the 
                                                      
175 526 U.S. at 355, quoting Silva v. Madison, 69 F.3d 1368, 1376 (7th Cir. 1995). 
176 In addition, Murphy Brothers implicitly disapproved of attorney trickery, or at least was reluctant to reward it.  
Undoubtedly, Michetti would argue, as it did before the Supreme Court, that faxing the courtesy copy was not an 
attempt to start the 30-day clock while lulling Murphy into complacency.  Perhaps, but we have personal experience 
with attorneys in the pre-Murphy Brothers era doing exactly that – or at least attempting to – but being thwarted by 
equally clever defense counsel recognizing the maneuver or trial courts that, like the Supreme Court in Murphy 
Brothers, rejected textual literalism.   
177 Dissenting Justices Rehnquist, Scalia and Thomas argued in dissent that “the Court does little to explain why the 
plain language of the statute should not control, opting instead to superimpose a judicially created service of process 
requirement . . . .”  For these reasons set forth herein we are not persuaded.  See 526 U.S. at 357 (Rehnquist, C.J., 
dissenting, jointed by Scalia & Thomas, JJ.). 
 In addition, Justice Rehnquist accused the majority of departing “from this Court’s practice of strictly 
construing removal and similar jurisdictional statutes.”  526 U.S. at 357.  To us, this sounds like the 13th chime of 
the clock and correspondingly breeds a lack of confidence in the dissent’s analysis.  “Strict” construction of the 
removal statute or other jurisdictional provisions does not mean literal – and certainly not broadly literal – 
interpretation of the words of the statute.  When cases, treatise, judges and lawyers speak of strict construction of 
subject matter jurisdiction and removal, they normally mean narrow construction because of the norm that federal 
courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, which correspondingly requires caution in ripping a matter away from a 
state’s judicial system.  The Murphy Brothers dissent represents in microcosm a significant problem with a 
purported “plain meaning” approach.  Too often courts professing to be taking this route are unclear or even 
wrongheaded about what the degree of breadth and scope to be accorded the allegedly plain text. 
178 See also Recognition Communications, Inc. v. American Auto. Ass’n, Inc., 1998 WL 119528 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 5, 
1998); Nannery, supra note 7, at 550 (describing Recognition Communications as the “first reported instance of the 
use of the snap removal device”); Robert P. Faulkner, The Courtesy Copy Trap:  Untimely Removal From State to 
Federal Court, 52 MD. L. REV. 374 (1993). 
179 Encompass Ins. Co. v. Stone Mansion Restaurant, Inc., 902 F.3d 147 (3d Cir. 2018), discussed at TAN 114-128, 
supra. 
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Fifth Circuit’s Texas Brine180 decisions approving snap removal cited Murphy Brothers, much 
less discussed it or reflected on its implications.  The Second Circuit’s Gibbons decision181 
favoring snap removal cited Murphy Brothers but only regarding the issue of the existence of 
state variance in service of process.  Gibbons made no attempt to assess the Supreme Court’s 
statutory construction methodology.    
 
 We find it more than a bit shocking that a relevant Supreme Court precedent regarding 
removal was essentially ignored by three circuit courts dealing for the first time (in their 
respective courts) with a removal issue that has divided district courts.  Instead, these circuit 
court panels relied on their own perceived linguistic competence to the exclusion of other 
interpretative factors, including relevant precedent.  
 
E. A Formalist Shortcoming of a Formalist Tactic: How Can an Unserved Defendant 
Have Standing to Remove? 
 
Also surprising to us is that the three appellate panels that have considered the propriety of 
snap removal as well as most of the trial courts addressing the issue have overlooked an arguable 
elephant in the room – whether an unserved defendant even has standing to remove prior to 
service.  At the risk of continued repetition, we again reproduce relevant statutory language. 
 
Except as otherwise expressly provided by Act of Congress, any civil action 
brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United States have 
original jurisdiction may be removed by the defendant or the defendants, to the 
district court of the United States for the district and division embracing the place 
where such action is pending.182 
 
In determining whether a civil action is removable on the basis of the jurisdiction 
under section 1332(a) of this title, the citizenship of defendants sued under 
fictitious names shall be disregarded.183 
 
A civil action otherwise removable solely on the basis of the jurisdiction under 
section 1332(a) [diversity jurisdiction] may not be removed if any of the parties in 
interest properly joined and served as defendants is a citizen of the state in which 
such action is brought.184 
 
 Although there is ample case law providing that a defendant need not be served in 
order to pursue removal,185 it is not at all clear that this result is compelled by the 
                                                      
180 Texas Brine Co., L.L.C., v. American Arbitration Association, 955 F.3d 482, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 10849 (5th 
Cir. April 7, 2020), discussed at TAN 120-25, supra.   
181 Gibbons v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 919 F.3d 699, 706 (2d Cir. 2019), discussed at TAN 129-132, supra. 
182 28 U.S.C. §1441(a) (emphasis added). 
183 28 U.S.C. §1441(b)(1)(emphasis added). 
184 28 U.S.C. §1441(b)(2)(emphasis added). 
185 See, e.g., Novak v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon Trust Co., N.A., 783 F.3d 910, 911-914 (1st Cir. 2015)(defendant may 
remove before service); Delgado v. Shell Oil Co., 231 F.3d 165, 177 (5th Cir. 2000)(service of process not absolute 
prerequisite to removal).  See Georgene M. Vairo, Removal, in MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE, §107.40 at p. 107-43 
(“Nothing in the statutes requires the defendant to have been served or to have appeared in state court before such 
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language of the statute.  To be sure, the first statutory reference is only to “defendants” 
without any requirement of service.  But this oblique reference is not much proof that 
Congress affirmatively approved of unserved defendants pursuing removal.   
 
One can make an equally compelling argument that one is not really a defendant until 
one has been served.  If that were not the case, lawyers would lack of the lengthy list of 
process serving anecdotes that accompany potential defendants (or actual defendants 
depending on one’s reading of the rules) working so hard to duck service.  Certainly, an 
unserved defendant is not at risk of an adverse judgment and owes nothing to the 
plaintiff.  For example, a large body of default judgment jurisprudence clearly establishes 
that unserved or improperly served defendants are entitled to vacate such judgments.186  
A reasonable attorney could logically conclude that until a client has been served, the 
client not only has no obligation to respond in any way (by answer, motion, or removal) 
but may even be precluded from responding until served. 
 
The same removal statute that uses the unadorned term “defendant” in 28 U.S.C. 
§1441(a) also provides in 28 U.S.C. §1441(b)(1) that the fictitiously named “Doe” and 
“Roe” defendants – who are by definition unserved – shall not be considered in 
determining the existence of diversity jurisdiction and eligibility for removal.  While one 
may read the existence of this special provision as proving that a general reference to a 
“defendant” does not mean a served defendant, one may also read this provision as 
treating unserved, unidentified parties not yet brought to the litigation as disqualified 
from participation in the litigation. 
 
Further, the problematic “joined and served” language of 28 U.S.C. §1441(b)(2), 
whatever mischief it has caused plaintiffs regarding snap removal, can be fairly read as 
suggesting that until a defendant is served, it is not part of the litigation and that an 
unserved defendant has nothing from which to seek removal.187 
 
It should not be forgotten that removal begins, of course, with a state court action.  
And many states provide that, unlike federal lawsuits commenced by filing,188 an action 
                                                                                                                                                                              
defendant may remove a case.  All the circuits to have decided the issue have held that the removing defendant need 
not have been served.”)(footnotes omitted) 
186 See STEVEN GENSLER, FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 120-29 (2018)(reviewing jurisprudence of Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 55 regarding default judgments and vacating default judgments); ROGER S. HAYDOCK, ET AL., 
FUNDAMENTALS OF PRETRIAL LITIGATION § 13.7 (10th ed. 2018)(same); BROOKE D. COLEMAN ET AL., LEARNING 
CIVIL PROCEDURE 726-28 (3d ed. 2018)(same). 
187 In a similar vein, some trial courts have imposed similar technical requirements on snap removal efforts, even in 
circuits that have approved snap removal generally.  See, e.g., Brown v. Teva Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 2019 WL 
5406218 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 23, 2019)(case is “removed” only after notice of the removal is filed and served in state 
court); Dutton v. Ethicon, Inc., 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 180567 D.N.J. Oct. 18, 2019)(same).  See also John L. 
Schweder II et al., Pepper Hamilton LLP, Winning the Removal Race: District Courts Put Limits on 'Snap Removal’ 
(Dec. 18, 2019), https://www.pepperlaw.com/publications/winning-the-removal-race-district-courts-put-limits-on-
snap-removal-2019-12-18; Steve Boranian, Removed to Federal Court? Not So Fast, Unless You’re Faster!, DRUG 
& DEVICE LAW BLOG, Nov. 1, 2019, https://www.druganddevicelawblog.com/2019/11/removed-to-federal-court-
not-so-fast.html. 
188 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 3. 
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is commenced only by effectuated service of process upon a defendant.189  Where this is 
the case, the U.S. Supreme Court has been extremely solicitous of state requirements 
mandating service before an action can proceed.  In the famous Ragan v. Merchant’s 
Transfer & Warehouse Co.190 case, the court found that the Erie Doctrine191 compelled 
obedience to the state service requirement and found plaintiff’s claim untimely even 
though plaintiff had commenced the action (for federal court purposes) by filing his 
complaint prior to the expiration of the relevant statute of limitations.  Even after Hanna 
v. Plumer192 modified Erie to provide greater deference to on-point Federal Civil Rules, 
the Court in Walker v. Armco Steel193 found that Fed. R. Civ. P. 3 was not sufficiently on 
point and reaffirmed that state service requirements controlled, throwing from court 
another plaintiff who had “beaten” the statute of limitations under Rule 3 but not 
according to state service requirements.   
 
The practical takeaway from these decisions is that an unserved party is not really a 
defendant as the term is normally understood and is certainly not a defendant at risk of an 
adverse judgment anytime soon.  Consequently, in cases where the party seeking snap 
removal is unserved, that party arguably lacks standing to seek snap removal.  If this 
construction of the removal statute held sway, docket-lurking Flash Boys removal would 
be precluded even if permitted in cases where plaintiff (perhaps foolishly) makes actual 
volitional service upon a non-forum defendant prior to serving a forum defendant. 
 
Notwithstanding that our analysis of the removal statute runs counter to a significant 
body of case law and commentary, there is recent precedent supporting our analysis.  In 
Felders v. Bairett,194 the court ruled that a defendant’s Rule 68 offer of judgment was 
ineffective because it was made prior to becoming a party in the litigation.  As the court 
described the chronology: 
 
Plaintiffs . . . initiated this litigation by filing their complaint on December 29, 
2008. . . . Plaintiffs asserted 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims alleging, among other 
things, that Defendant Bairett and other law enforcement officers violated 
Plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment rights during a traffic stop. In February 2009, 
before Plaintiffs served Bairett (or any other defendant) with a summons and the 
complaint, Bairett offered to settle the case by paying the driver, Felders, $20,000 
and passengers Madyun and Hansend $2,500 each.  Bairett's offer, entitled 
"Defendant's Rule 68 Offer of Judgment," stated, among other things, that 
 
[i]n accordance with Rule 68, if Plaintiffs do not accept this offer in 
writing within ten (10) days after service [of the offer], the offer shall be 
                                                      
189 See, e.g., Minn. R. Civ. P. 3.01.  In this type of jurisdiction, snap removal is comparatively rare but not 
impossible.  For example, a plaintiff might effect service on a non-forum defendant, who then seeks removal before 
service is effect upon the one or more forum defendants in the litigation. 
190 337 U.S. 530 (1949). 
191 Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).  See BROOKE D. COLEMAN, ET AL, LEARNING CIVIL PROCEDURE 
193-229 (3d ed. 2018)(discussing Erie and implications). 
192 380 U.S. 460 (1965). 
193 446 U.S. 740 (1980). 
194 885 F.3d 646 (10th Cir. 2018). 
50 
 
deemed withdrawn and evidence thereof is not admissible except in a 
proceeding to determine costs. If Plaintiffs subsequently obtain a 
judgment against these Defendants that is not more favorable than this 
offer, Plaintiffs must pay the costs and fees that the Defendants incur 
after making of the offer. 
 
Plaintiffs did not accept Bairett's offer. Two months later, in April 2009, Plaintiffs 
timely sent Bairett's counsel a request to waive service of the summons and 
complaint, which Bairett's attorney executed. . . . 
 
Six years later, a jury found Defendant Bairett liable for unlawfully searching 
Plaintiffs' car and awarded the driver, Felders, $15,000, and her two passengers, 
Madyun and Hansend, nominal damages of $1 each. After the jury'sverdict, 
Plaintiffs moved "To Strike and/or Deem Ineffective Bairett's Alleged 'Offer of 
Judgment.'" The district court granted that motion, ruling that Bairett's February 
2009 offer to settle the case did not qualify as a Rule 68 offer to allow judgment 
against Bairett because he made that settlement offer before he became a party to 
this litigation. Bairett appeals that decision.195 
 
 Rule 68 provides that a “party defending against a claim” may serve an offer of judgment 
upon an “opposing party.”  Officer Bairett was obviously defending against plaintiff’s claim but 
his offer of judgment was deemed ineffective because he had not been served.  According to the 
Bairett Court: 
 
[t]o be effective, a Rule 68 offer of judgment must be made after the plaintiff (1) 
files the complaint with the court and (2) obtains jurisdiction over the defendant 
in that litigation by service of the complaint on that defendant or obtaining his 
waiver of service.196 
 
 The court found that eligibility to make a Rule 68 offer required more than merely being 
named a defendant in a complaint.  Quoting the Supreme Court’s Murphy Brothers opinion, 
Bairett took the view that “one becomes a party officially . . . only upon service of a summons or 
other authority-asserting measure stating the time within which the party served must appear and 
defend.”197 “Until an entity has been served and is brought into an action formally, he can do 
nothing in the action – let alone “defend[] against a claim.”198 “We conclude, then, that the 
                                                      
195  885 F.3d at 649-50 (citations to record removed). 
196  885 F.3d at 652 (boldface removed) 
197  885 F.3d at 652, quoting Murphy Bros., Inc. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, Ins., 526 U.S. 344, 350 (1999).  Accord,  
Yavuz v. 61 MM, Ltd., 576 F.3d 1166, 1175 (10th Cir. 2009)(finding that defendants who were never served “were 
never made parties” to the action and that only a proper “party” defending a claim could make a Rule 68 offer of 
judgment); E.E.O.C. v. Am. Fed’n of State, County & Mun. Emps., 1996 U.S., Dist. LEXIS 17536 (N.D. N.Y. Nov. 
12, 1996)(settlement made before entity became party to case not considered a settlement pursuant to Rule 68 offer 
of judgment).  See also Andrews v. Joyce, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 212396 (D. Utah Dec. 9, 2019)(following Felders 
v. Bairett and holding service a requirement for exercise of judicial power over a defendant).   
198 885 F.3d at 653 (brackets the court’s).  See also 4A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & ADAM N. 
STEINMAN, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §1093 at 676 (2015)(defendant not required to answer and 
defendant until service of process has been made on defendant); Thomas D. Rowe, Applicability of Rule 68, 13 
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language of Rule 68  dictates that a defendant must be made a party to the litigation, by service 
of a summons and the complaint, or waiver of service, before that defendant can make a valid 
Rule 68 offer to allow judgment against him [and potentially shift post-offer costs to the 
opposing party].”199 
 
 The Tenth Circuit’s view – that a named defendant in a filed case must be served before 
availing itself of procedural options established by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure logically 
applies to procedural options (such as removal) established by statute.  Although one may 
reasonably debate the decision in Bairett (as did the dissent), its rationale logically requires 
defendants to be made a party to a case via service of process before it may seek removal.  If 
applied to snap removal, the logic of Bairett would forbid the practice. 
 
 We favor the Bairett majority’s approach, albeit with acknowledgment that service may 
not be required as a condition of eligibility for use of all procedural devices.  Some procedural 
option may be unduly devalued if they are only permitted to be used after service.  But Rule 68 is 
not one of them.  When invoking the Rule and making an offer of judgment, the defending 
offeror is establishing a framework whereby the coercive power of the court may later be used to 
impose penalties on an opposing party that rejected the Rule 68 settlement offer.  In order to 
enlist the court’s coercive power, the party seeking its benefit should itself be subject to that 
coercive power.   
 
 Removal provides a similar situation in which the right to remove is not unduly 
undermined by limiting the right only to those defendants that have been served.  By filing a 
petition of removal, the removing entity is invoking the coercive power of the national judicial 
system to literally rip a case away from a state court.  Although a practice of long standing, it is 
at least in tension with traditional American federalism in that it triggers federal court power 
over a co-ordinate judicial system.  Such power should be subject to invocation only by a party 
that has been served and become subject to the judicial power of the state system that is to be 
stripped of a case on its docket. 
 
 At the very least, cases like Bairett suggest that courts permitting snap removal have been 
remiss in not at least examining the question of how an entity that is not even officially part of a 
case can eject that case from a state judicial system.  Becoming part of the case through service 
should be the “price of admission” for seeking removal.  Such a requirement would drastically 
reduce opportunities for snap removal – a result that emphasizes the degree to which snap 
removal is a fissure in the system occasioned by unintended consequences of drafting and 
insufficient judicial scrutiny more than it is an unambiguous command from a Congress that 
adjourned 70 years ago.   
                                                                                                                                                                              
MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE – CIVIL §68.03 (citing Bairett majority and dissent but no other authority on the issue 
of whether an unserved defendant may make Rule 68 effective offer). 
199 885 F.3d at 656.  A dissenting judge argued that the majority’s construction of Rule 68 was inconsistent with the 
concept of a “party” to litigation in other contexts such as Fed. R. Civ. P. 12 where defendants argue that a court 
lacks subject matter or personal jurisdiction over the dispute or the defendant.  The dissent further contended that 
Officer Bairett was as a practical matter a defendant party once the complaint was filed. See 885 F.3d at 656-58 
(Tymkovich, J., dissenting)(“I would thus hold a named defendant has the power to offer judgment under Rule 68 
from the moment the complaint is filed”).  Although Judge Tymkovich’s position is consistent with permitting pre-
service snap removal it is, of course, a dissenting view. 
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A “short way” with snap removal200 that would ameliorate some of its worst excesses 
would be to simply prohibit its use by an unserved defendant.  Although there would remain 
some cases where a plaintiff seeking to sue in state court errs by serving non-forum defendants 
ahead of forum defendants, construction of the removal statute akin to the Felders v. Bairett limit 
on use of Rule 68 would prevent the most egregious instances of snap removal gamesmanship. 
 
IV. Restoring Congressional Intent and Litigant Balance Through Modest Revision 
of the Removal Statute 
 
A. Our Proposal 
 
Apt use of removal could be restored through a relatively simple amendment to 28 U.S.C. 
§1441(b)(2) that merely deletes the “and served” language from the statute, thereby eliminating 
the opportunity for opportunism by forum state defendants and co-defendants who can file 
removal petitions prior to service. 
 
Although there currently exists precedent permitting dismissal of a “sham” defendant, 
including sanctions for parties using the tactic, defendants contend the practice is not sufficiently 
policed.201  To accommodate this legitimate concern of defendants, we propose that §1441(b)(2) 
be amended as follows: 
 
A civil action otherwise removable solely on the basis of the jurisdiction under 
section 1332(a) of this title may not be removed if any of the parties in interest 
properly joined and served as defendants is a citizen of the state in which such 
action is brought.  If no defendant who is a citizen of the forum state is served 
within 120 days of commencement of the action, removal may be sought within 
the time period provided by Section 1446. 
 
 This relatively straightforward change would eliminate Flash Boys/race-to-the-
courthouse snap removals as well as forum defendant removal based on trickery (e.g., refusing to 
accept service by mail as in Stone Mansion) or opportunistically taking advantage of 
insufficiently industrious plaintiff counsel.   
 
The logical intuition that a defendant unserved after four months is probably not an 
important defendant (and certainly not a target defendant) is made a controlling presumption 
though use of a hard-and-fast 120-day time limit for service on the forum state defendant.  This 
time period is long enough to comfortably account for services delays occasioned by state rules 
or custom, the vast bulk of logistical problems that may delay service, and the practical abilities 
of defendants to duck service of process. 
 
                                                      
200 See Max Radin, A Short Way With Statutes, 56 HARV. L. REV. 388 (1942).  We use the phrase with irony as 
Professor Radin was a pronounced textualist suspicious of reliance on legislative history.  We disagree.  In addition, 
the case for considering legislative history and context has gotten stronger over the years as legislatures have 
become subject to increasing scrutiny, with their work and its background and context increasingly memorialized in 
a variety of official and secondary sources. 
201 See ?? (discussing fraudulent joinder doctrine). 
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Critics may be concerned that this fix could potentially allow a partial return to the status quo 
that prompted the 1948 Congress to add the service language to the statute – the risk that a 
plaintiff would name a forum state citizen as a defendant solely to defeat removal with now 
intent of actually pursuing relief against that defendant.  We think this risk is effectively 
eliminated by the additional language we propose adding to §1441(b)(2), which requires service 
on a forum defendant within 120 days if removal is to remain barred for the defendants.  In this 
manner, opportunities for gamesmanship or sharp practices by either plaintiffs or defendants is 
minimized.            
 
B. Other Proposals of Note 
 
1. The Hellman, et al. Correction by Addition 
 
Other proposals for eliminating snap removal have been advanced.  The most publicized, 
although capable of alleviating the problem, comes with some cost of added complexity and 
required litigation activity for those seeking to avoid snap removal.   
 
In a 2016 article noting the problems posed by snap removal, a group of prominent law 
professors critical of the tactic proposed amendment to the removal statute that would (in their 
words) “neutralize” the tactic of snap removal202 by arming plaintiffs with the following 
countermeasure that would be enacted as a new subsection to 28 U.S.C. §1447:203 
 
 (f)  Removal before service on forum defendant 
 
 If – 
 
(1) a civil action was removed solely on the basis of the jurisdiction 
under section 1332(a) of this title, and 
 
(2)  at the time of removal, one or more parties in interest properly 
joined as defendants were citizens of the state in which such action 
was brought but had not been served, but 
 
(3)   after removal was effected, any such defendant was properly 
served within the time for service of process allowed by the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the court, upon motion filed 
within 30 days after such service, shall remand the action to the 
state court from which it was removed. 204 
                                                      
202 See Arthur Hellman, Lonny Hoffman, Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Joan Steinman, and Georgene Vairo, Neutralizing 
the Stratagem of “Snap Removal”: A Proposed Amendment of the Judicial Code, 9 FED. CTS. L. REV. 103 (2016). 
203 Professor Hellman has advocated the group’s proposal in testimony before the House Judiciary Committee 
Subcommittee on Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Internet.  See Statement of Arthur D. Hellman at Hearing on 
Examining the Use of “Snap” Removals to Circumvent the Forum Defendant Rule (Nov. 14, 2019).  Coincidently, 
Professor Hellman, an obvious critic of snap removal in seeking to legislatively curtail it, was significantly involved 
in the 2011 Amendments to the removal statute (see id. at 2-3) – something we regard as further evidence that the 
2011 changes should not be read as an implicit ratification of snap removal. 
204 Id. at 107. 
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According to the authors, enactment of their proposal will create a situation where “the 
incidence of snap removal can be expected to diminish sharply, as defendants come to recognize 
that the strategem will no longer enable them to circumvent the forum-defendant rule.”205  In 
addition, the proposal offers a side benefit in that the “upon motion” requirement clarifies and 
confirms that the forum defendant rule is not jurisdictional, and is therefore waivable and not to 
be raised by the court sua sponte.206  Finally, by leaving the existing text of the relevant removal 
statutes unchanged, their solution-by-addition likely minimizes the risk of unintended 
consequences. 
 
We see the Hellman et al. proposal as having several problems.  First, one might worry 
that the proposal could have the undesired effect of entrenching snap removal into the removal 
scheme. The very presence of proposed §1447(f) might be seen as strengthening the case for the 
plain-language interpretation of §1441(b)(2) that gives rise to snap removal in the first place. 
 
Second, there could be problems in cases where the plaintiff is unable to serve the forum 
defendant within the period set by Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m) (including as extended by the court).  It is 
not immediately clear what would happen then.  Presumably the federal court would dismiss the 
unserved defendant without prejudice.207  But that would not seem to trigger the snapback 
countermeasure.  Nor would the snapback countermeasure appear to be triggered if the plaintiff 
were to re-file against the forum defendant back in state court.  In that event, the scheme would 
result in the original action being split between the state and federal courts. 
 
Third, one might wonder whether defendants will behave as predicted and stop 
attempting to invoke snap removal.  The tactic will remain effective whenever the snapback 
countermeasure is not deployed.  Might defendants just continue to give it a try?  Not all 
plaintiffs’ attorneys will know of the countermeasure, and some might fail to deploy it properly 
and on time.  There would seem to be little downside for the defendant.  Even if the case is 
“snapped back” to state court, the defendant loses nothing and may gain in some way from the 
added delay.   
 
Also, because the proposal does not disallow snap removal (and in some ways may be 
seen as enshrining it), it would seem that defendants could claim an objectively reasonable basis 
for snap removal and thereby stay clear of any fee-shifting consequences under §1447(c).208  If 
defendants adopt a “might as well try it” attitude, then plaintiffs and courts will still need to 
divert resources to achieve the proposal’s intended goal. 
 
Fourth, the snapback countermeasure makes the already long and complicated statutory 
scheme for removal even longer and more complicated.  This reflects a longstanding trend.  The 
removal statutes are filled with complicated moving parts added over the years in reaction to 
games and strategies developed by enterprising lawyers.  Adding yet one more moving part can 
                                                      
205 Hellman et al., supra note 202, at 109. 
206 Id. 
207 Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m) (any dismissal for failure to timely serve must be without prejudice). 
208 See Martin v. Franklin Capital Corp., 546 U.S. 132 (2005) (fee-shifting available under section 1447(c) only if 
the defendant lacked an objectively reasonable basis for removing). 
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potentially correct the problems presented by snap removal, but does so at the accompanying 
cost of still more length and complexity in the removal statute. 
 
2. The AAJ Proposed Change to Rule 4 and Service of Process 
 
The American Association for Justice (“AAJ”)(formerly ATLA – the American Trial 
Lawyers Association)209 has suggested eliminating snap removal not through an amendment to 
the removal statutes but to Fed. R. Civ. P. 4.  In particular the AAJ proposal would add a new 
subsection (6) to Rule 4(d) that reads 
 
(6) Constructive Waiver.  When any defendant has actual notice that a lawsuit has 
been filed against it, all defendants to the lawsuit will be deemed to have waived 
service of the summons, provided that formal service takes place within thirty 
(30) days of any action taken by any defendant so that all defendants have formal 
notice of the lawsuit and it shall be deemed that such service will relate back to 
the date of actional notice to any defendant.210 
 
 The AAJ proposal would in essence substitute knowledge of a lawsuit for formal service, 
at least as regards removal so long as service is effectuated within 30 days.  Although aimed at 
snap removal, this constructive date of service-via-notice/knowledge would presumably affect 
other deadlines in civil litigation – which is one reason it is not our favored solution.  Altering 
the effective date of service may have unintended consequences that are too difficult to calculate 
in advance.  Even if the ripple effects of the AAJ change could be calculated with precision, we 
are reluctant to support a change in procedural law (either rule or statute)211 that goes beyond 
                                                      
209 As is generally known, the AAJ is “the world’s largest plaintiff trial bar” with members that “primarily 
represented plaintiffs in personal injury actions, employment rights cases, consumer cases, and other civil actions.”  
See Letter of August 30, 2019 from AAJ President Bruce Stern to Rebecca A. Womeldorf, Secretary, Committee on 
Rules of Practice and Procedure, Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts at 1. 
210 Id. at 3. 
211 There are, of course, technical and practical differences between amending a Rule of Civil Procedure and 
amending a statute.  The latter requires passage by the House and Senate with Presidential signature or 
congressional override of a veto.  With the strong anticipated opposition of the defense bar and commercial 
defendants such as drug companies, passage of anti-snap removal legislation appears a hard lift in the current 
political climate. 
      Amendment of a civil rule avoids some but not all of the legislative concerns, which may be part of its attraction 
to the AAJ.  Pursuant to the 28 U.S.C. §2072 (The Rules Enabling Act), an amendment is respectively promulgated 
by the Civil Rules Committee, the Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, and the U.S. Supreme 
Court, whereupon the new or revised rule becomes effective in roughly six months unless Congress intervenes.  
In practice, however, this path may be only slightly less daunting than amending the removal statute.  Many 
judges, at least half the practicing legal profession (the portion representing plaintiffs) and, insofar as we can 
determine, all law professors with an opinion oppose snap removal.  But conversely, defense lawyers and roughly 
half the judges addressing the issue, including all nine federal circuit judges that have weighed in, have “approved” 
snap removal.   
We used the work approved advisedly in that judges sustaining snap removal have done so due to a 
professed compulsion commanded by the “and served” language of §1441(b)(2).  While these judges have not found 
literal application of the language to create an “absurd” result, this is not the same as approval of snap removal.  So 
far as we can determine, no current Supreme Court Justice has expressed an opinion regarding snap removal.   
It thus seems to us that the political barriers to change regarding snap removal are nearly as high when 
pursuing a rule change as if pursuing statutory amendment.       
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what is needed to address the perceived problem of snap removal.  The AAJ nonetheless argues 
that  
 
[t]he addition of a constructive waiver section to Rule 4 would simply provide 
that when any one defendant has actual notice that a lawsuit against it has been 
filed, all defendants will be deemed to have waived service of the summons so 
that service will related back to the date of actual notice.  Thus, defendants have 
actual notice who are trolling state filings would no longer be allowed to snap 
remove the case to federal court under §1441(b)(2), and removal proceedings would 
instead be carried out as intended by the [the forum defendant rule, so long as service 
takes place within 30 days of commencement of the action].212  
 
Section 1441(b)(2) was enacted so that plaintiffs do not name, and then never 
serve, an in-state defendant in order to avoid removal, and the proposed rule’s 
requirement of formal service within 30 days would satisfy this concern.  If 
services does not occur within 30 days, then §1441(b)(2) can take effect.213 
 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the AAJ proposal was specifically opposed by Lawyers for Civil 
Justice (“LCJ”), a group representing defendant interests.214  In addition to defending snap 
removal on the merits based on the language of §1441(b)(2) and in light of the Second and Third 
Circuit decisions approving the tactic, LCJ argued that using a revision to Fed. R. Civ. P. 4 to 
negate a statute was improper and violated the Enabling Act requirement that Rules changes not 
“abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right” of litigants.215 
 
3.  Treating the Forum Defendant Rule as Jurisdictional 
 
Also suggested is amendment to the Judicial Code that makes clear that the forum 
defendant rule is jurisdictional and therefore cannot be circumvented based on lack of service on 
the forum defendant or the relevant timing of removal vs. service.  Prior to the 1948 Amendment 
the removal statute, the Judiciary Act of 1789 
 
                                                      
212 Id. at 3. 
213 Id. at 3-4 (footnoted omitted). 
214 Although the LCJ letter, unlike the AAJ letter, does not specifically identify the organization’s ideological and 
jurisprudential orientation, the LCJ letterhead gives more than a little clue as to the groups orientation in that it 
reflects a Board of Directors with representatives of Ford Moor Co., Boston Scientific, Merck & Co., Pfizer, 
GlaxoSmithKline, Johnson & Johnson, Eli Lilly & Co., Medtronic, Microsoft, Shell Oil, Exxon Mobil, State Farm, 
and several prominent defense firms such as Bowman and Brooke, Gordon & Rees, and Goldberg Segalla.  See 
Letter of October 15, 2019 from LCJ President Mike Weston to Rebecca A. Womeldorf at 1.  Similarly, the 
organization’s website describes LCJ embers as “preeminent corporate and defense counsel” that are concerned 
about “[t]he soaring cost of litigation.”  See https://www.lfcl.com (visited April 24, 2020).  A closer look at the 
Group’s substantive concerns reflects concern that Multidistrict Litigation proceedings “have become one-sided 
forums for settlement pressure that lack the protections of the” Federal Civil Rules, that Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(6) 
imposes undue burdens on corporate defendants and their representatives, that discovery directed at defendants is 
unduly burdensome, and that courts are lax in admitting expert testimony proffered by plaintiffs.  Id.   
215 See Weston Letter, supra note 214, at 2.  In addition, LCJ argued that an imposed waiver of service effective 
retroactively violated the due process rights of defendants and argued that removal was not particularly 
disadvantageous to plaintiffs because the substantive law to be applied would not change based on the forum. 
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achieved its preferred result by declining to extend removal jurisdiction to suits 
initiated against forum defendants in state court.  Current law, by contrast, has 
been interpreted as a non-jurisdictional barrier to the removal of suits naming 
forum defendants.  By framing the barrier to removal of cases involving forum 
defendants in jurisdictional terms, Congress could presumably end the practice of 
snap removal.  The forum defendant rule would thus resemble the jurisdictional 
rule of complete diversity, which operates as a barrier to removal that snap 
removal cannot overcome.216 
 
To date, however, we have not seen this assessment set forth in proposed legislation or suggested 
language amending the removal statute. 
 
4.  The Clermont-Pfander Fix 
 
In testimony before a U.S. House Judiciary Subcommittee, Professor James Pfander outlined 
a proposal he deemed the “Clermont Fix” as it arose out of correspondence between the two 
scholars.217  Under this proposal, which accords with our view that a defendant does not have 
standing to remove until it has actually been brought into the action via service of process, 28 
U.S.C. §1446 would be amended to make removal available only to a “properly served 
defendant” rather than merely a “defendant,” as the current statute reads.  The revised §1446(a)  
would state 
 
(a) Generally – a properly served defendant or defendants desiring to remove any civil 
action from a State court shall file in the district court of the United States for the district 
and division within which such action is pending a notice of removal . . . containing a 
short and plain statement of the grounds for removal, together with a copy of the process, 
pleadings, and orders served upon such defendant or defendants in such action. 
 
Professor Clermont notes that prior to the advent of the snap removal tactic, it was “pretty 
much accepted law” that if Plaintiff served a non-forum Defendant first, this Defendant “could 
remove despite” the naming of a forum defendant in the complaint but that Plaintiff had “the 
                                                      
216 See Hearing: Examining the Use of “Snap” Removals to Circumvent the Forum Defendant Rule, Subcommittee 
on Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Internet of the Committee on the Judiciary of the U.S. House of 
Representatives (Nov. 14, 2019)(Testimony of James E. Pfander, Owen L. Coon Professor of Law, Northwestern 
University Pritzker School of Law) at 10-11 (footnote omitted)(further noting that “[m]ost courts take the position 
that the forum defendant rule “is a mandatory, but non-jurisdictional, case processing rule.”  Id. at 10, n. 18, citing 
Encompass Ins. Co. v. Stone Mansion Restaurant, Inc., 902 F.3d 147, 152 (3d Cir. 2018), Morris v. Nuzzo, 718 F.3d 
660, 665 (7th Cir. 2015), In re 1994 Exxon Chemical Fire, 558 F.3d 378 (5th Cir. 2009) and also noting, however, 
that “[s]ome courts have viewed the forum-defendant rule as jurisdictional for some purposes” (citing Horton v. 
Conklin, 431 F.3d 602 (8th Cir. 2006), which found the forum defendant rule jurisdictional in that appellate review 
of a remand order was precluded). 
217 See Hearing: Examining the Use of “Snap” Removals to Circumvent the Forum Defendant Rule, Subcommittee 
on Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Internet of the Committee on the Judiciary of the U.S. House of 
Representatives (Nov. 14, 2019)(Testimony of James E. Pfander, Owen L. Coon Professor of Law, Northwestern 
University Pritzker School of Law). 
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protective ability” to serve the forum Defendant first in order to block removal.218  He 
characterizes such an amendment as one that  
 
[w]ould hardly be radical.  The removal statutes seems to assume that the 
removing defendant is already in the action.  It is pre-service removal that makes 
snap removal so controversial.  Pre-service removal also enables defendants to 
avoid the all-defendants-must-consent rule in [28 U.S.C. §1446(c)(2).219 
 
 In his testimony before a House Judiciary Committee Subcommittee, Professor Pfander 
endorsed this approach, implicitly agreeing with this article’s view that decisions permitting snap 
removal are inconsistent with U.S. Supreme Court precedent.220  He noted that  
 
[m]any aspects of the Clermont fix fit well with current law.  For starters, removal 
law tends to assume that the parties effecting removal have been served; indeed, 
the Supreme Court made this assumption explicit, holding that the 30-day 
removal clock begins when defendants have been formally served with the 
complaint.  The holding rejected the removal-defeating strategies of plaintiffs 
who were acting to shorten the time for removal by providing defendants with 
pre-service courtesy copies of the complaint.  The Clermont fix would accomplish 
something similar, deferring removal until after the removing defendant has been 
served. 
 
In addition, the Clermont fix would preserve much of current law while allowing 
the plaintiff to exercise control of the timing of service and thereby pretermit snap 
removal by serving the forum defendant first.  If no removal can be had until 
service on at least one defendant has been perfected, then the plaintiff can make a 
strategic choice.  Current law already incorporates such choices on the part of 
plaintiffs, giving all defendants a full 30 days to remove after service, but 
enabling plaintiffs to shorten the total time for removal by serving all defendants 
at roughly the same time.  See 28 U.S.C. §1446(b)(2)((B)-(C).  While further 
study may be warranted, it appears to me at present that the Clermont fix provides 
the cleanest solution to the problem of snap removal.221 
  
C. A Preference for Simplicity and Prevention in Restoring Fairness and Congressional 
Intent and Purpose 
 
The Hellman et al. proposal discussed above has been characterized as a curative or 
corrective approach to the snap removal problem in that it does not bar snap removal but 
provides a means by which a removed case involving a forum defendant may be snapped back to 
federal court. 
                                                      
218 Memorandum from Professor Clermont to Professor Pfander, quoted in Pfander Testimony, supra note 226, at 
11. 
219 Id. at 11 
220 See TAN 171-181, supra (discussing Murphy Bros., Inc. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, 526 U.S. 344 (1999). 
221 Pfander Testimony, supra note 214, at 12, citing Murphy Bros., Inc. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, 526  U.S. 344, 
356 (1999) and summarizing it as “dating the time for removal from the date of service of process, rather than form 
the earlier date on which the plaintiff sent the defendant a courtesy copy of the complaint.”   
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By contrast, the other proposed means of addressing snap removal are preventive in that they 
would all stop removal in cases involving a forum defendant.  The AAJ Rule 4 proposal deems 
service effective upon and retroactive to the date of notice.  The jurisdictional proposal makes 
removal of a case involving a forum defendant a nullity.  The Clermont/Pfander proposal 
precludes removal unless the defendant has been served, which in turn effectively precludes snap 
removal unless the plaintiff provides defendants with the opportunity by initially serving a non-
forum defendant.222  Our proposed correction-by-subtraction that excises the “and served” 
language from the statute also prevents snap removal from taking place. 
 
All of the anti-snap removal proposals have merit and would improve upon the current 
doleful situation that seems to grow increasingly worse at the appellate level.  But like Professor 
Pfander, we think that in the context of snap removal, “an ounce of prevention is worth a pound 
of cure.”223  Consequently, we have concerns that the Hellman et al. proposal is not optimal in 
that it at least partially institutionalizes and validates snap removal, something we find 
conceptually troubling in that the practice should have been uniformly rejected had all courts 
adopted the correct characterization and analysis of the practice. 
 
To be sure, the Hellman et al. proposal provides a ready means of undoing snap removal that, 
if effectively implemented by plaintiffs, would probably lead to the withering away of the tactic 
or at least make it inconsequential.  But even this best case outcome has the effect of not only 
making the removal process more complex and logistically cumbersome but also lengthening an 
already long and complex removal law.   
 
It also creates a new opportunity for gamesmanship.  A defendant may, pursuant to the 
Helman et al. revision, effect snap removal and then seek to evade service of process long 
enough to prevent plaintiff’s restoration of the case to federal court.  In addition, the prospect of 
the service-dodging defendant court result in trial courts  
 
tempted to proceed with the parties then before the court as the plaintiff seeks to 
serve the forum defendant.  Or district courts might put the matter on hold 
pending some resolution of the service question.  Either way, the plaintiff’s ability 
to secure an adjudication of the merits in state court will have been thwarted or 
delayed. 
 
What’s more, the proposed statute could be read to establish a mid-course switch 
from state to federal rules for the determination of the timing and legality of 
service of process on forum defendants.224 
                                                      
222  And to perhaps point out the obvious, snap removal is precluded in any case where there is only one defendant 
that is a citizen of the forum. 
223 See Pfander Testimony, supra note 214, at 7. 
224 See Pfander Testimony, supra note 214, at 8.  Elaborating, Professor Pfander explained that 
 
[u]nder current law, plaintiffs filing in state court effect service of process on defendants in 
accordance with state law.  If some properly served (or docket-monitoring) defendants agree to 
remove, federal law specifies the rule that governs post-removal service of process on unserved 
defendants.  Section 1448 provides that in cases in which service has not been perfected prior to 
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 The AAJ “notice-deemed-service” amendment to Rule 4 has the virtue of preventing snap 
removal, but does so through the indirect means of amending a Civil Rule rather than the 
removal statute containing the problematic language that is the source of the problem.  In 
addition, as discussed above, it has the potential to lead to unintended consequences and make 
for an overbroad solution to the snap removal problem that could needlessly create additional 
problems. 
 
 Treating the forum defendant rule as jurisdictional in the manner of the complete 
diversity rule would work if it could be aptly operationalized.  But this method of preventing 
snap removal would, absent additional provisions, re-open the door to plaintiffs naming forum 
state defendants merely to thwart removal rather than for the process or prosecuting legitimate 
claims against the forum defendant.  The 1948 Congress sought to close that door, a sentiment 
likely shared by modern legislators. 
 
 The Clermont-Pfander proposal holds promise and like our preferred correction of the 
snap removal problem, is relatively modest and easy to effectuate.  Clermont & Pfander seek 
only to add two words to 28 U.S.C. §1446, while our prime objective is deleting two words from 
§1441(b)(2).  Our proposal then has the extra textual burden of adding language that would 
require service of the forum state defendant within 120 days in order to prevent delayed removal.  
No similar provision appears to be part of the Clermont-Pfander approach. 
 
 In this case, however, we think the added verbiage and service requirement is worth the 
modest increase in burdens and complexity in that it increases the likelihood that a forum state 
defendant is genuinely joined to face claims on the merits rather than for procedural 
maneuvering.  While Clermont-Pfander does not encourage such maneuvering and does require 
service of the forum state defendant in order to thwart snap removal, it holds open more prospect 
than we would like for snap removal facilitated by ministerial error.  For example, a less skilled 
attorney may bungle into serving a non-forum defendant ahead of service on the forum 
defendant.     Or the process servers retained by counsel may mistakenly fail to serve the forum 
defendant first.   
 
Alternatively, the burdens of service on a forum defendant may be sufficiently vexing 
(perhaps because of intentional misconduct by the forum defendant) that easier and more 
immediate service on a non-forum defendant gets effected, inadvertently stripping the plaintiff of 
the protections of the forum defendant rule.  By contrast, under our proposal, snap removal is 
precluded for 120 days, which should be ample time for plaintiffs to deal with service difficulties 
surrounding forum and non-forum defendants. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                              
removal, service may be “completed” (as specified in state rules) or new process “issued in the 
same manner as in case originally filed” in federal court.  28 U.S.C. §1448.  The proposed statute 
might be read to eliminate the state law “completion” option and compel new process to issue in 
compliance with federal rules.  In any case, uncertainty as to the operation of new Section 1447(f) 
and current Section 1448 might occasion further litigation. 
 
Id. at 8. 
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Conclusion 
 
 Treatment of snap removal tactics has been something less than the judiciary’s finest 
hour, particularly at the appellate level.  Too many judges have permitted use of this problematic 
procedural loophole.  Congress can and should correct this emerging wrong turn in the law.          
 
 
